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FACES WITHOUT FEATURES: THE 




A jury can hear testimony that a defendant checked into a motel 
with another person and checked out an hour and forty minutes later, 
be left with no doubt that an act of adultery was committed, but still be 
uncertain as to whether the legal burden of proof was met. No amount 
of circumstantial evidence adduced at the trial will obviate the jurors' 
problem in understanding what the judge meant with his talk of "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" or "beyond a reasonable doubt." For lay-
men there will be in many cases a quantum jump from drawing 
conclusions to a sense of having correctly applied the burden of proof 
standard. Uncertainty can result from the terminology used to explain 
the burden or simple naivete in drawing conclusions. 
Common law judges devised an economical solution to this prob-
lem of juror uncertainty. For some stereotypical cases the judges created 
instructions designed to inform jurors that certain facts suffice to proye 
other facts . These instructions are on deductions called inferences. 
Their usual form is an expression of a generality, not a comment upon 
the evidence: the judge says "from spending less than overnight in a 
motel with another person, you can conclude the guest engaged in sex," 
not "from the evidence here that defendant spent an hour and forty 
minutes in a motel, you can conclude he engaged in sex." Through the 
years some inferences hardened into presumptions, or legal requirements 
that the jury find certain facts from proof of other facts . Meanwhile, 
legislatures have also been fashioning inferences and presumptions. 
Until the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in County 
Court 11. Allen I the legal community presumed that the Constitution re-
quired both the permissive inference and the compulsory presumption 
• Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. The author thanks 
Professor Stephen Kroll for his generous help with a draft of this article. 
I 442 U.S. 140 (1979). 
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to meet a standard of rationality: probable long-run truth. Thus, 
whether the trial judge told the jury they may or they must find that 
defendant engaged in sex, the test of validity was the same. The review-
ing court would ask itself whether people who check into motels for less 
than a night with another usually do engage in sex; if the answer was 
yes, then the evidentiary device, be it presumption or inference, satisfied 
the demands of due process. 
Then the A/Im case reached the Court: three men and a sixteen-
year-old girl were riding in a car stopped for speeding; the officer looked 
in and saw a gun sticking out of a handbag, which was located next to 
the girl; it transpired that the handbag contained two loaded guns. All 
four were charged with possession of the guns. This would seemingly be 
a troublesome case for a jury. All of the car's occupants probably knew 
of the presence of the guns, but possession also requires some element of 
control. The guns probably were held by the girl on behalf of one .or 
more of the men, at least from the moment it appeared that the car 
would be pulled over, both for concealment and transferral of guilt to 
her in case of detection. But two guns do not go into three men evenly; 
the futility of ascribing the guns to a particular man or men is a reason 
for doubting the guilt of the male defendants. 
Yet the jury convicted. Could it be because the trial judge had told 
them that from the fact of a gun being in a car, jurors could infer that 
every occupant of the car possessed that gun? An article of faith with 
commentators is that this kind of instruction inclines a juror toward con-
viction without determination of the precise location, characteristics, or 
visibility of the guns, or of the peculiarities of the occupancy of the car 
by 'the defendants, for example, where they sat in relation to the guns.2 
In A/Im, however, the Supreme Court proclaimed that the instruction 
does not incline jurors to convict upon a generalization about guns in 
2 See Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A 
Tl1toretit:al Ovmliew, 19 YALE L.J. 165, 201 (1969); Brown, Tiu Constilulionality of Sta/ulo,y Cnin,~ 
nal Presumptions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 141, 152 (1966) ; Ncsson, Reasona/Jle l'Jouqt and Pmni.ssiw 
lnfermt:es: Tiu Value efCompluity , 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1192 (1979); Orland, Presumptions: 
Rej/tt:tions on Wasl,z°nKton's Proposed Rule 301, 13 GoNZ. L. REV. 935, 940 (1978); Soules, Pre-
sumptions in Cnininal Cases, 20 BAYL. L. REV. 277, 286 (1968); Tl,e Suprnne Court 1968 Tmn , 83 
HARV. L. REV. 7, 110 (1969); Comment, Criminal Sta/ulo,y Presumptions and /1,e Reasona/Jle l'Jouqt 
Standard of Proo.f Is Due Process Ouerdw?, 19 ST. Louts L.J. 223, 229-33 (1974); Note, S/a/ulo,y 
Cnininal Presumptions: Judicial Slezgl,t ef Hand, 53 VA. L. REV. 702, 702-06 (1967); Comment, 
Statutory Cnininal Presumptions: R«ont:ili"K llu Practical will, llu Sacrosanct , 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
169 (1970) . C.f. Sandler, Tiu Statutory Prts11111JJ1ion zn Ftdlral Nart:0ti&s Prostt:Ulions, 51 J. CRIM. 
L.C. & P.S. 7, 9 (1966). That a commentator is nominally discussing presumptions docs not 
mean he is not analyzing cases which actually involved inferences. 
The Supreme Court has also assumed that inference instructions pressure the jury. See 
United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1965). 
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cars and the occupants thereof, and in fact that instructed inferences do 
not incline a juror to do anything. 
Neither the Allen majority nor the four dissenters attempted to ex-
plain the workings of instructed inferences. The dissent shares the com-
mentators' intuition mentioned above, but intuition does not obviate 
the necessity to offer reasons. This article will offer nonempirical 
grounds to show that instructed inferences operate as the dissenters be-
lieve, at least when the instruction does not explicitly refer to the evi-
dence at trial, but to occurrences in general. 
The constitutional holding of Allen also seems fallacious. As stated 
above, traditionally the Court disposed of challenges to deduction in-
structions by considering the device without regard to the evidence in 
the case, simply by deciding whether the proffered deduction was accu-
rate in the long run. The Court's opinions never stated that the vulnera-
bility of the ~evice in question varied with whether it was a presumption 
or an inference. In Allen, however, the majority "discovered" that only 
presumptions had been tested with regard to long run truth, or what is 
known as facial validity. Because inferences, by contrast, are drawn by 
the jury in tne light of the evidence, challenges to instructed inferences 
had been and would continue to be limited to the test of validity as 
applied. This latter exploration consists of testing the trial evidence of 
the basic fact (occupancy of a gunladen car) for its sufficiency to support 
a finding of the inferred fact (possession of a gun) . Rather than occu-
pancy in the abstract, the particular way in which the occupancy was 
manifested in the case is examined. This approach is not a "confirma-
tion" of the inference as instructed (which was in generalities), but is 
rather a denial that possible general inaccuracy of the inference has sig-
nificance in a 'trial. 
Despite what the Court held in Allen , criminal inferences still have 
faces , but given the Court's barring of testing facial validity, these are 
now faces without features. In sum, the Allen Court saw jurors as virtu-
ally unaffected by inference instructions; despite the instructions, they 
would still consider the evidence and draw rational conclusions from it 
alone. However, a judge's charge that the jury can find a defendant 
possessed a gun from the fact of his occupancy of a car containing that 
gun does more than simply tell the listener to consider the evidence for 
what it is worth. The charge is much closer to being an invitation to 
decide the case on a bald generalization. And if the generalization is not 
tested the way generalizations are usually tested, is not the rationality of 
the factfinding process a moot point? 
Unfortunately, aside from some indications that jurors do not know 
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what "inference" means,3 experiments indicating how juries interpret 
inference instructions have not been performed.4 But the A/Im problem 
can be approached nonempirically by analysis both of the possibilities of 
use of inference instructions and of the meaning an ordinary juror is 
likely to attach to the instructions. These lines of inquiry will point to-
ward the proper treatment of inference instructions for constitutional 
purposes. 
II. COUNTY COURT V. ALLEN 
In County Court ll. A/Im 5 three men and a sixteen-year-old girl were 
riding in an automobile on the New York Thruway, the girl with the 
driver in front and the other two men in the back, when police stopped 
their car for speeding. The police officer saw the "butt" of a gun pro-
truding from a handbag in the car.6 A .45 caliber automatic pistol and 
a .38 caliber revolver, both loaded, were in the open handbag, which 
rested on either the front floor or the front seat, on the passenger's side. 7 
A machine gun and heroin were in the trunk of the car. Police could 
not find the key to the trunk, but the evidence indicated two of the 
occupants had placed something in the trunk before embarking; the car 
itself had been borrowed by the driver from his brother earlier that 
day.8 
The four riders were indicted by a New York grand jury for posses-
sion of the two loaded handguns,9 the machine gun, 10 and a pound of 
3 Forston, Smse and Non-Smse: Jury Trial Communir:alion, 1975 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 601, 615 (85 
percent of jurors cannot choose correct definitions of thirteen listed terms, including "infer-
ence''). 
4 S..e MATERIALS ON JURIES AND JURY RESEARCH (P. Lermack ed. 1977); Erlanger.Jury 
Research in America, 4 LAW & Soc. REV. 345 (1970); Reed, Jury Simula/ion: The lmpat:J of Judge's 
lnslnl&Jions and Allorney Tar:Jia on IJer:isionmaling, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 68 (1980). 
5 442 U.S. 140 (1979). 
6 Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979); see 442 U.S. at 
144 n.2 (one gun visible). Conlra, County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 143 (two guns visible). 
7 The Court said that the handbag was "on either the front floor or the front seat of the 
car on the passenger side," 442 U.S. at 143, because from its reading of the record "(t)he 
evidence would have allowed the jury to conclude either that the handbag was on the front 
floor or the front seat." Id at 163 n.25. Yet the parties agreed that the handbag was on the 
floor. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, supra note 6; Brief for Respondent at 4, County Court v. 
Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). The other courts that spoke to this matter agreed that it was on 
the floor. Allen v. County Court, 568 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1977); Allen v. County Court, 
No. 76-4794 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 1977), rep,inud in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 34a, 
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979); People v. Lemmon, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 508-09, 354 
N.E.2d 836, 838-39, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (1976); People v. Lemmon, 49 A.D.2d 639,641, 370 
N.Y.S.2d 243, 246 (1975) (dissenting opinion). 
8 442 U.S. at 144. 
9 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 265.05(2) (McKinney 1967), now § 265.02(4) (McKinney 1980). 
"Possess" is defined as "to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or con-
trol over tangible property." Id § 10.00(8) (McKinney 1975). 
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heroin, 11 and were tried together. A New York statute declares that the 
proven occupancy of a nonstolen automobile at the time a firearm is 
found in it is "presumptive evidence" of possession of that firearm by the 
occupant. 12 The statute excepts weapons found upon the person of an 
occupant, drivers of hired automobiles, and weapons licensed to be car-
ried by an occupant. 13 Another statute creates a similar presumption 
for controlled substances.14 The judge instructed the jury that the Penal 
Law provided that upon proof of presence of guns or narcotics in an 
automobile the jury could infer that these items were possessed by each 
person who occupied the automobile at the time the contraband was 
found. 15 
The jury convicted the defendants of possession of the handguns 
and acquitted as to the machine gun and heroin. After affirmance of 
the convictions, 16 a United States district court granted the men (the 
girl not having petitioned) writs of habeas corpus on the ground that the 
inference of possession was not reasonable on the facts of the case. 1 7 The 
Court of Appeals (or the Second Circuit affirmed, stating that the statu-
tory deduction was unconstitutional on its face. 18 The Supreme Court 
granted the state's petition for certiorari.19 
The Court reversed, five-to-four. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Stevens stated as a premise that a litigant has no standing to argue that 
a statute would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in hypo-
thetical situations. The Second Circuit therefore erred in testing the va-
lidity of the gun-in-the-car statute on its face. That court had evaluated 
the statute by applying it to "implausible" situations in which it was 
improbable a jury would convict or a prosecutor even prosecute. But, 
Justice Stevens said, respondents had no standing to argue those hy-
10 Id. § 265.05(1) (McKinney 1967), now § 265.02(2) (McKinney 1980). 
1 1 Id. § 220.23 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73), now§ 220.21 (McKinney 1980) (four ounces) . 
12 Id. § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1980). 
13 The New York courts deemed the defendants to have waived the fint exception by 
failing to request that the jury be instructed to determine if the exception was applicable. 
People v. Lemmon, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 512, 354 N.E.2d 836, 841, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (1976). 
14 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 220.25(1) (McKinney 1980); see 442 U.S. at 155 n.14. This statute 
was held constitutional in Lopez v. Curry, 583 F.2d 1188· (2d Cir. 1978), and People v. Lcvya, 
38 N.Y.2d 160, 341 N.E.2d 546, 379 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1975) (by implication) . 
15 The charge as to weapons is set out in note 166 in.fta . 
16 People v. Lemmon, 49 A.D.2d 639, 370 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1975) (mem.), iftl, 40 N.Y.2d 
505, 354 N.E.2d 836, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1976) . 
17 Allen v. County Court, No. 76-4794 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 1977), reprinutl in Petitioner's 
Brief for Certiorari at 33a, County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140. The court also granted the 
writ because the statute was inapplicable "as a matter of law." Id. at 36a. 
18 Allen v. County Court, 568 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1977). One judge, concurring in result 
only, would have affirmed on the ground the inference was unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 
1011-12. 
19 439 U.S. 815 (1978) . 
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potheticals, which involved hitchhikers or other casual passengers who 
might not know of the presence of the gun or might not have control of 
it. 20 
The Court had, in fact, tested some statutory deductions on their 
face, but these devices had been presumptions, referred to by Justice 
Stevens as "mandatory presumptions." Presumptions compel a jury's 
findings, absent rebuttal. A jury cannot reject a presumption by its own 
evaluation of the state's evidence; it follows that the validity of a pre-
sumption is logically divorced from the facts of the case, and turns on 
the accuracy of the presumption in the run of cases. Justice Stevens 
distinguished inferences as "permissive inferences or presumptions." 
Here a jury is free to credit or reject the deduction, and the burden of 
proof is unaffected; hence application of the reasonable doubt standard 
is implicated only if, under the facts of the case, the jury can in no ra-
tional way make the connection permitted by the instructed inference. 
Accordingly, past decisions did not test the validity of inferences on their 
face but only as applied. In the presumption cases, by contrast, the 
amount of evidence in the record has been irrelevant. 2 1 
Turning to the case at hand, Justice Stevens stated that the trial 
judge made it clear the inference was merely a part of the state's case, 
that it gave rise to a permissive rather than a mandatory conclusion of 
possession, and that it could be ignored by the jurors even absent rebut-
tal evidence. When coupled with the instructions on reasonable doubt 
and the presumption of innocence, plainly the jurors were directed to 
consider all the circumstances tending to support or contradict the infer-
ence and to decide the matter for themselves.22 Because the device was 
permissive in this case, it must be evaluated as applied to the record, not 
on its face. Considering the unlikelihood that the girl was the sole custo-
dian of the handguns or the only person able to control them, the in-
structed inference was rational as applied. Justice Stevens viewed the 
case as one in which the guns were in plain view of all occupants, and 
thus ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over them 
could be inferred. 23 Hence the basic facts proved were rationally con-
nected to the ultimate facts inferred, and the latter were more likely 
than not to flow from the former, linkage beyond a reasonable doubt 
being required only for presumptions. The inference was constitutional, 
so issuance of the writs must be denied.24 
20 442 U.S. at 154-56, 162-63. The Coun fint resolved an issue of jurisdiction to issue 
habeas corpus. Id. at 147-54. 
2 1 Id. at 157-60. 
22 Id. at 160-62. 
23 Id. at 162-65. 
24 Id. at 165-67. Chief Justice Burger wrote a brief concurring opinion. Id. at 167. 
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Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, 
dissented. Justice Powell felt instructions in this case encouraged the 
jury to find certain facts. Because such instructions suggest to a jury 
that it would be sensible to draw certain conclusions, the precedents 
have required in criminal cases that inferences reflect some valid general 
observat-ion about the natural connection between events as they "occur 
in our society."25 Justice Powell read no recognition in the Court's prior 
decisions that the distinction between presumptions and inferences was 
relevant.26 
The charge in this case undeniably encouraged the jury to draw a 
particular inference regardless of the evidence. The inference charged 
was unconstitutional, Justice Powell said, because it did not fairly reflect 
what common sense and experience tell us about passengers in 
automobiles and the possession of handguns. Occupants are not more 
likely to be the possessors of guns in the car. 27 While the majority relied 
on all of the evidence to justify the inference the instruction authorized 
the jury to convict on the facts of occupancy and presence of the gun 
alone-the majority simply ignored the possibility that the jury discred-
ited all other evidence, such as the visibility and precise location of the 
guns.28 (The majority answered Powell's last argument principally by 
finding an exact congruence between the proof that the guns were in the 
car and the proof of their precise location in the girl's handbag.29 But 
the majority overlooked the possibility that the jury believed the officer's 
testimony that he recovered the guns from the car but disbelieved that 
the guns were in the handbag. Such bifurcated crediting of testimony is 
quite plausible in a "plain view" case. 30) 
25 Id. at 168-72 (Powell, J., joined by Brennan, Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) . 
26 Id. at 1 70 n.3. 
2 7 Id. at 173-74. 
2a Id. at 175-76. 
29 Id. at 166 n .29. The majority found additional support for its hypothesis of how the 
inference worked in the fact that the jury acquitted for possession of the contraband in the 
trunk of the car. Id. But the Chief Justice, while joining "fully in the Court's opinion," 
thought the verdict was "rather obviously a compromise verdict." Id. at 167 (concurring 
opinion) . 
30 Juries often may accept testimony in bite-sized portions; if a witness swears he entered a 
room on a certain occasion and saw it was green, the jury can credit his entrance and reject 
his description. &, 1 E. DEVrIT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS § 17.08 (3d ed. 1977) (right to reject all testimony of witness if part disbelieved; this 
right implies a right to believe only part). The A/Im jury could have analytically separated 
the evidence that the guns were in the car from testimony as to the precise location of the 
guns inside the car. Even the majority stated that the jury could have found that the guns 
were in either of two places on the testimony, see note 7 sup;a, and this does not begin to 
consider a jury finding constructed out of rejection of all testimony on exact location. The 
testimony on the location of the gun asserted that a gun was partially visible; this is known as 
plain or open view testimony. S« Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464 (1971) 
(plurality opinion). The officer's testimony had its antecedents in a pretrial hearing on a 
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Justice Powell concluded by analyzing the Court's opinion as per-
mitting the use of any instructed inference, no matter how irrational, 
provided sufficient evidence exists to support a finding of guilt. In con-
clusion Justice Powell characterized the majority's reasoning as apply-
ing an unarticulated harmless error standard.31 
Ill. PRESUMPTIONS, INFERENCES, AND THE ALLEN PROBLEM 
Because so many of the Allen Court's conclusions depend upon the 
classification of a deduction device as a presumption or an inference, a 
clear understanding of these terms and their functional relationship to 
each otl,ler is necessary for understanding of the issues raised by Allen. 
A presumption is a legal compulsion to find a fact. If the basic or 
evidentiary fact is proven at trial,32 the factfinder is compelled by law-
the presumption-to treat the presumed fact as found. This compulsion 
is subject to a condition subsequent: if there is proof that the presumed 
fact is not the case, then it is not found as a result of the presumption, 
the presumption having been rebutted. The judge instructs a presump-
tion as follows: If you find that fact A has been proven, then you must 
conclude that fact B has been proven, unless the evidence persuades you 
that fact B is not the case. 33 What quantum of evidence is necessary for 
the jury to find that the presumption has been rebutted, and what is the 
vitality, if any, of a rebutted presumption, are topics which have gener-
ated an elephantine literature.34 What must be borne in mind is that a 
presumption forces a conclusion of one fact from proof of another, and 
the only escape from the operation of a presumption is for its opponent 
to persuade by evidence-not argument against the logic of the pre-
sumption-that the presumed fact is not accurate. 35 
motion to suppress the guns as illegally seized evidence. See People v. Lemmon, 49 A.D.2d 
639, 641 , 370 N.Y.S.2d 243, 246 (1975) (dissenting opinion). Plain view testimony at such a 
hearing is often the notorious "dropsy" tale, in which the officer swears that the defendant 
openly abandoned the contraband at his approach. Dropsy testimony is so suspect that the 
renowned district attorney of New York County, Frank S. Hogan, once asked the New York 
Court of Appeals to impose a higher burden on ltim when dropsy testimony was offered. 
People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 270 N.E.2d 709, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1971) . In short, an 
officer who testifies that contraband was in plain view is often disbelieved. In Alim , belief of 
the officer entailed believing that the custodian of the guns was unable to secret them before 
being pulled over. 
31 Id. at 1 77. Cj the inference analysis in text accompanying notes 110-13 in.fro. 
32 The basic fact could alao be judicially noticed, or stipulated to, or judicially admitted, 
or be presumed or inferred. S« Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 100 (1966). 
33 See l j . WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 300[01) (1978); 1 j. WJG-
MORE, EVIDENCE§ 25 (3d ed. 1940); MODEL CoDE OF EVIDENCE rule 701(2) (1942). Contra, 
FED. R. EvID. 301. 
34 See l J. WEINSTEIN, mp,a note 33, , 300[01), at 300-01. 
35 One major variation is that the opponent must merely produce enough evidence to 
support a finding that the presumed fact is not the case and then the presumption drops out 
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An inftrence is a deduction of B from A which the factfinder is free 
to make or not as it sees fit. 36 While one presumes in obedience to law, 
one infers as an act of choice based upon reasoned evaluation of the 
evidence.37 Of course, all persons are more or less continually engaged 
in the mental activity of inferring and choosing not to infer whether 
sitting as factfinders or going about daily life. The drawing and re-
jecting of conclusions from perceived events, such as deducing that a 
person is outside the threshold from a knock at the door, are inescapable 
psychological events. 
Jurors will therefore weigh many inferences without instructions 
from the judge. Suppose that the evidence shows a letter was mailed. 
Even if the judge says nothing about the conclusion to be drawn from 
this, the jury will probably infer that the letter was received. Going to 
the opposite extreme, suppose the judge instructed a presumption: "If 
you find the letter was mailed, you must find that it was received, unless 
you are persuaded by the evidence that it was not received." Now the 
jury will definitely find that the letter was received, unless the jury is not 
law-abiding, or the evidence of nonreceipt is persuasive. 
The Allen problem revolves around a variation lying between the 
poles of a naturally drawn inference and a presumption: the judge tells 
the jury "If you find the letter was mailed you may, if you wish, con-
clude that the letter was received." This is an instruction of an infer-
ence, called an "instructed inference" in this article. Often a reference 
by courts and commentators to an inference is a reference to an in-
structed inference, and sometimes is a reference to the inference drawn 
following the instruction of an inference. The instruction literally allows 
the jury the option of inferring receipt of the letter, but then again, the 
jury usually has the option of inferring the ultimate fact even without an 
instruction. I say "usually" because irrational instructed inferences are 
not unknown to the law, and it is obviously not the case that a factfinder 
has the option, absent a special rule (the instructed irrational inference), 
to draw an irrational conclusion. Are irrational instructed inferences 
unconstitutional? What is the standard for determining whether an in-
structed inference is irrational? These questions are facets of the A/Im 
problem. 
of the trial. Su Morgan, Furtlzn 06snvalions on Presumplions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 245, 247-49 
(1943) . Two weeks after A/Im the Coun apparently held that in criminal cases the Constitu-
tion requires that defendants be allowed to rebut presumptions in this manner. Sandstrom v. 
Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
36 R . LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 882-83 (1977); 1 
D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE§ 67, at 536 (1977) . 
37 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 90, at 144 (13th ed. 1972); 
Gausewitz, Presumplions in a One-Rulll World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324, 327 (1952). &e also CAL. 
EvID. CoDE § 600 (West 1966). &e p,urally 21 WORDS AND PHRASES, lnfnmee (1960). 
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At common law instructions telling jurors that they can infer in 
general raise no issue. 38 Besides telling a jury that it has a right to draw 
conclusions in general, judges have often talked about the evidence in 
the case and suggested possible lines of inference from specific facts. 
Such instructions------inference "hints" that are born and die with particu-
lar cases, because they are grounded in the peculiarities of particular 
trials--have been approved or disapproved according to a jurisdiction's 
philosophy of the trial judge's right to comment upon the evidence. 39 
What is under discussion here is an instruction tailored ad hoc to the 
evidence, such as "If you find that defendant got behind the wheel of 
the automobile at 9:00, you can infer that he was driving the car at the 
time of the accident at 9: 10." If the jurisdiction allows such comment 
upon the evidence,40 evaluation of this instruction depends upon the 
rationality of inferring the ultimate fact absent the instruction-the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to support a finding of the inferred fact . 
But the motive force in evidence law has been recognition that re-
curring situations forge generalized acceptable or unacceptable deduc-
tions. Acceptability has depended upon whether the logic of the 
deduction is sufficiently compelling, or either insufficiently or excessively 
compelling, in which case evidence of the basic fact is prejudicial. The 
acknowledged value of the collective experience of the courts has led to 
admissibility, limited admissibility, or inadmissibility of a host of recur-
ring items of evidence41 and, inevitably, endorsement of recurring infer-
ences, and, finally, presumptions. Thayer further documented the 
historical evolution of given facts, demonstrating how they eventually 
become the bases of substantive rules of law.42 First, courts accept that a 
given fact tends to prove another fact (relevance), and later decide that 
the given fact is sufficient to find the other fact. The given facts here are 
36 See Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc. , 364 U .S. 325, 331 (1960); CoMMrITEE ON 
PA'ITERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PA'ITERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 10 (Dis-
trict Judges Ass'n, Fifth Circuit 1979). 
39 See 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 488 (1969); McCormick, 
Whal Shall We Tell lluJlll)I A/Jou/ Presumptions?, 13 WASH. L. REV. 185, 188 (1938); Wright, 
lnslructionslolheJlll)I: Summary Wilhou/Commml , 1954WASH. U.L.Q . 177. 
Inferences instructed in generalities, discussed below in text, might also be rejected by 
jurisdictions that frown on judicial comment. See George v. Alexander, 229 Ark. 593, 317 
S.W.2d 124 (1958) ; Clifford v. Lee, 23 S.W. 843 (fex. Civ. App. 1893); Lappin v. Lucurell, 13 
Wash. App. 277, 285, 534 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1975) . 
40 See Holland v. United States, 348 U .S. 121, 129 (1954) ; Stone v. Geyser Quicksilver 
Min. Co., 52 Cal. 315, 318-19 (1877) ; Pridmore v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 275 Ill. 386, 394, 
114 N.E. 176, 179 (1916); Peters v. Boumcau, 22 Ill. App. 177, 178-79 (1887); Kennedy v. 
Phillips, 319 Mo. 573, 589-90, 5 S.W.2d 33, 39-40 (1928); Hammond v. Coursey, 2 Posey 29, 
33 (f cx. Comm'n Ct. 1880). 
41 See C. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE§§ 184-211 (E. Cleary ed. 1972). 
42 J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE CoMMON LAW 317-31 
(1898). 
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not about drivers at 9:00, of course, but are more generalized, such as 
the fact of leaving town shortly after a crime has been committed (tends 
to prove consciousness of guilt)43 or absence for seven years (sufficient to 
prove death).44 
To insure that the jury understands the probative value of a fact, 
and even to encourage them to find other facts, the trial judge might 
instruct that the basic fact is sufficient to find the ultimate fact. If 
higher courts approve of this instruction---or the legislature originates or 
codifies it-then the Allen type of inference is created. There is little 
point to courts collecting and memorializing instructions that are tai-
lored to the evidence, because the details of the evidence (driving at 
9:00) will not likely recur; there is even less reason for the legislature to 
enact such specific inferences. Hence the instructed inferences that are 
passed down and around by the courts or that are enacted by legisla-
tures are in general terms. 
Below, the facts of County Court v. Allen are placed in a matrix which 




AD HOC INFERENCE: 
Occupancy of a car containing a gun tends to 
make the occupant's possession of that gun more 
probable than if the occupancy and the presence 
of the gun were not known. 45 Determination 
that evidence is relevant here leads to its admis-
sion in a possession case. Relevancy is a matter 
of logic, but at one time authority played a large 
role.46 
Having admitted the evidence, the judge has the 
option of instructing the jury that it may con-
sider occupancy and presence of the gun on the 
issue of possession. But often the judge will not 
explain what evidence tends to prove, leaving 
that to counsel in summation. Instructions on 
relevance are principally limiting instructions: 
directions not to use evidence to prove certain 
facts.47 These limitations result from fear that 
jurors will overestimate the logical value of evi-
dence, or from policies extraneous to the logic of 
proof. 
Having found occupancy and presence, 
43 See C . McCoRMICK, supra note 41, at§ 271. 
44 See 25A C.J.S. IJeallt § 6 (1966). 
45 FED. R . Evm. 401. 
46 The Federal Rules of Evidence prescribe logical, not legal (handed down by authority) 
relevance. See 22 C . WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 5164, 
at 38-41 , 43 (1978). 
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factfinder decides to conclude that there was 
possession, influenced by the particularities of 
the case, for example, where defendant was sit-
ting in the car, where _the gun was. (Matters not 
going to occupancy and presence are assumed to 
be unproven or irrelevant, because the A/Im 
problem is about conclusions from the basic 
facts as set forth in instructions.) By upholding 
the verdict, the courts endorse the inference of 
possession.48 If the judge has instructed "from 
the evidence of occupancy and presence you 
have heard, you may find possession," then the 
case presents an instructed, tailored inference as 
well-a judicial comment upon the evidence. 
This raises a general question of whether judges 
should comment in jury trials. 
The judge instructs "from occupancy and pres-
ence you may deduce possession." This instruc-
tion does not explicitly refer to the 
particularities of the case; it originates in the 
common law process or with the legislature. 
The courts could have occasion to approve this 
inference even if it were not instructed, as by 
laying down a general rule that occupancy and 
presence suffice to prove possession. But does 
the converse hold true--does approval of the in-
struction endorse the sufficiency of such evi-
dence? This is an important aspect of the A/Im 
problem.49 
The judge instructs "if you find occupancy and 
presence, you must find possession, unless the 
defendant persuades you of non-possession." 
Presumptions are inevitably created and in-
structed in general terms. Presumptions which 
require defendants to persuade are unconstitu-
tional in criminal cases, as of a few weeks after 
Allm.50 
The judge instructs "if you find occupancy and 
presence you must convict." Given the abstract 
nature of possession, is this not what is practi-
cally being instructed by the A/Im trial judge? 
48 &e Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947). 
49 Cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 68 (1965) (statute authorizing jury to infer 
guilt from presence at still docs not deprive judge of discretion to take case from jury or 
render a judgment n.0.11. ). 
50 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
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The progression from relevance to substantive rule on this matrix 
indicates the increasing significance of occupancy of a car and presence 
of a gun therein both as proof of possession and as a reason in itself to 
impose criminal penalties, at least if one assumes knowledge of the gun. 
Transformation of inferences and presumptions into substantive rules is 
more common and explicable in civil law, where the basic facts are more 
likely to have social significance in their own right, such as where a 
spouse's absence for seven years is of as much substantive significance as 
that spouse's death. Still, even in the criminal area, evidentiary facts 
have been transformed into crimes, as in jostling51 and perhaps posses-
sion of a weapon. 52 In any event the Supreme Court has rejected consti-
tutional justification of criminal deduction devices through the 
substantive significance of the basic fact. 53 
County Court v. Allen raises questions as to the precise evidentiary 
significance of the basic fact in an instructed generalized inference. This 
device lies somewhere between an ad hoc deduction offered by the judge 
and which the jurors understand to be utterly voluntary and grounded 
solely in the particularities of the evidence, and a generalized deduction 
offered to them independently of the evidence and carrying an expressed 
degree of encouragement. Does the Allen inference push the jurors' de-
liberations into the particularities of the evidence, as claimed by the 
Court, or does it hoist them out of the specifics of the case like a pre-
sumption? How much pressure, if any, does the Allen instruction exert 
upon the jurors? What should be the test of constitutionality of the in-
ference? The balance of this article shall address these questions. 
IV. FACIAL VALIDITY AND VALIDITY AS APPLIED 
A. DEDUCTION DEVICES PRIOR TO ALLEN 
The Supreme Court in County Court v. Allen read its precedents as 
requiring a party challenging the constitutionality of an inference "to 
demonstrate its invalidity as applied to him," even though presumptions 
had "generally" been examined on their face. 54 No cases had suggested 
that inference statutes should be examined for facial validity, the Court 
said.55 • 
51 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 165.25 (McKinney 1975). . 
52 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 265.01(2) (McKinney 1980) (possession Q{ dangerous instrument 
with intent to use); id. § 265.15(4) (presumption of intent to ~)- q. J. HALL, CRIMINAL 
LAw 206-07 (2d ed. 1960) (possession is not an act or omission); W. LAFAVE & A. Scarr, 
CRIMINAL LAW § 25, at 182 (1972) (same). 
53 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463,472 (1943). Bui see County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 
140, 155 (1979) (legal risks of riding in vehicles containing dangerous weapons) . 
54 442 U.S. at 157-58. 
55 Id. at 163. 
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Determining the accuracy of the Allen Court's reading of history 
involves the usual difficulties when distinctions are newly made. First, 
as to whether a particular precedent involved a presumption or an infer-
ence: the Court's nomenclature has never been uniform, so labels in 
opinions are of no help here. Moreover, while the Court now recognizes 
that what is involved in an evidentiary deduction device case is that 
which is instructed to the jury,56 this was not always so clear to the 
Court, so some decisions do not even quote, much less analyze in depth, 
the jury charge. While the instructions in precedents are a matter of 
record, the importance of instructions in cases which do not treat them 
in depth is dubious. Second, the Allen distinction between facial validity 
and validity as applied is similarly elusive in the precedents. As the 
Court has not explicitly found this distinction significant in past pre-
sumption and inference cases, the closest reading can lead to only an 
approximate pigeonholing. Inspection of the cases leads to the conclu-
sion, however arguable, that the precedents cited in Allen all involve 
inferences and tests of facial validity. 
Constitutional challenge to a presumption or an inference is based 
on the due process clause. 57 From the outset due process has employed 
in various formulations the common law criterion for fashioning infer-
ences and presumptions:58 the deduction must be likely to accord with 
truth.59 Constitutional citation is the principal difference between a 
56 Id at 158 n.16; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 514. 
57 A few presumptions have been struck down under other clauses, but these cases are for 
the most part ultimately grounded on the consideration that informs due process: rationality. 
See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (191 I) (thirteenth amendment), and Keyishian v. Board 
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (first amendment), both discussed in note 70 infta. In Oyama 
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), a presumption was struck down under the equal protection 
clause under a theory that does not ultimately depend on lack of rationality as much as on 
disparate treatment of the affected individual. 
58 So-called "artificial" presumptions, though, are not based on the logic of experience, 
but may be grounded in considerations of procedural efficiency or social policy. See Morgan, 
Tiu Law of Evidmce /911-1915, 59 HARV. L . REV. 481,495 (1946); Morgan, Further Observa-
tions on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L . REV. 245 (1943). 
59 See text accompanying notes 38-44 supra . The first case in the Court to articulate rea-
sons for upholding or striking down a presumption or inference was Adams v. New York, 192 
U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court said that the presumed fact "likely" followed from the basic 
fact . See the discussion of Adams in note 70 infta. Prior to Adams the Court had considered 
the constitutionality only of the presumption of regularity of proceedings leading up to deliv-
ery of a tax deed. Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 472,476 (1851); see Turpin v. Lemon, 
187 U.S. 51, 59 (1902); Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U.S. 172, 182 (1893). See also Diaz v. United 
States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912). The Court in Pillow said that the power of the legislature to 
create the presumption "cannot be doubted." 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 476. Since the case pre-
dated the fourteenth amendment, the statement was probably a reference to a state's legisla-
tive subject matter jurisdiction under the Constitution. Compare the statement in Adams that 
"it is within the established power of the State to prescribe the evidence which is to be re-
ceived in the courts of its own government." 192 U.S. at 599. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 1356 (2d ed. 1923). This theory is resurrected in Vance v. Terrazus, 444 U.S. 252, 267-70 
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Supreme Court opinion determining whether a deduction device exists 
as part of federal common law and an opinion determining the constitu-
tionality of one of these devices. 60 Indeed, one of the constitutional deci-
sions relied heavily on the common law in upholding a state inference.61 
This discussion concerns what I call the "internal" validity of pre-
sumptions and inferences, that is, whether a given deduction device is 
sufficiently rational. Of no concern to the Allen problem is what I call 
the "external" validity of a presumption or inference, that is, whether 
these devices as a genre can be used in criminal cases, a much mooted 
problem related to placing burdens of proof on a criminal defendant,62 
and arguably the proving of facts without using evidence.63 Until Allen, 
the only heated issue relating to internal validity was whether the gener-
alization embodied in the deduction had to be true beyond a reasonable 
doubt, or merely more likely true than false. 64 The issue was apparently 
resolved by a glancing dictum in Allen stating that presumptions must 
satisfy a reasonable doubt standard, and that inferences need only be 
more likely than not correct.65 
(1980). q: 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 1356 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) (Wigmorc view regard-
ing unnecessary application of a rationality standard has given way to a constitutional rule 
requiring a rational connection between facts and presumptions). 
Two other rationales have been used to validate presumptions: (I) the power to substan-
tively regulate the basic fact includes the power to create a presumption based upon it, Ferry 
v. Ramsey, 277 U .S. 88 (1928), and (2) the convenience to the defendant, compared with the 
prosecutor, of disproving the presumed fact, see Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928). 
These cases arc discussed in note 70 infta. Both theories have been abandoned by the Court, 
at least in criminal cases. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. at 469,472. A hint of revival of 
theory (1) appears in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1977) . 
60 See Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559 (1918); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 
(1896). For a list of presumptions and inferences recognized by the Court as part of federal 
law, see 7, 7A UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT DIGEST LAWYERS' EomoN, Euidmce 
§§ 115-420 (1979). 
61 Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973). 
62 See Allen, Tiu Restoration of In re Winsltip: A Commn,t on Burdms of Per=ion in Cnminal 
Cases a.fin Patterson u. New Yor.t, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30 (1977); Jeffries & Stephan, IJefmses, 
Presumptions and BurtHfl of Proof 111 Cnininal Cases, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979); Underwood, Tlte 
Tltumb on tlze &ales of Justice, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977); Note, Tiu Constitutionalil)I of Ajfirmatiue 
Difmses a.fin Patterson 11. New Yor.t, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 655 (1978). Some commentators have 
implied that burden-of-persuasion shifting presumptions have never been constitutional in 
criminal cases. See C . McCoRMICK,supra note 41, § 342, at 804; Ncsson,supra note 2, at 1201 
n.34. The Court had, however, upheld such presumptions, although the shifting of the bur-
den of proof issue had not been raised. See Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922), and Adams 
v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), both discussed in note 701nfta . The Court has now explic-
itly held that burden of persuasion shifting devices are unconstitutional. Sandstrom v. Mon-
tana, 442 U .S. 510. The Court implied that burden of production shifting presumptions 
would be constitutional. 
63 See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 425 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 71, 74 (1965) (Douglas and Black, JJ., dissenting). 
64 See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973). 
65 442 U .S. at 166-67. 
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As the Allen ruling that presumptions must be facially valid while 
inferences must be valid as applied is not explicit in the prior cases, anal-
ysis of these cases requires examination of what was done, but not 
stated, in those decisions. To the Allen Court, the facial validity test of a 
presumption consists of looking at the basic fact A in the instruction, 
which is inevitably a general fact (an occurrence or condition describa-
ble without reference to the evidence) , and determining if the presumed 
fact is associated therewith in the world with the requisite frequency 
(under Allen, beyond a reasonable doubt). Only plausible hypothetical 
instances of A in the world are surveyed, "plausible" meaning instances 
which would in fact be prosecuted or lead to affirmed convictions.66 
The instance of A revealed by the evidence at trial is irrelevant. 67 The 
test of validity as applied of an inference is performed by examining the 
evidence of A to determine if a rational factfinder could deduce B there-
from as being "more likely than not true. "68 This examination is appar-
ently intended to reconstruct the jury's use of the instructions on the 
inference. 69 The evidence shows an instance of A which will be more or 
less suggestive than the generalized A of a presumption; it is the differ-
ence between knowing where defendant was sitting in the car, where the 
gun was, and other factors relating to occupancy and presence, versus 
simply considering all the "plausible" cases of people in cars containing 
guns. 
The decisions cited by the Allen majority-all of the significant 
criminal cases of the modern era-will be examined here in text. The 
balance of the presumption and inference validity cases in the Court, 
both criminal and civil, are examined in a footnote. 70 The footnote 
66 Id. at 155 & n.14. 
67 Id. at 159-60. 
68 Id. at 166. But if. note 138 z'nfta (noting confusion over what evidence is used in making 
the inference) . 
69 442 U.S. at 164. 
70 This footnote will discuss all post-fourteenth amendment Supreme Court cases on the 
constitutionality of presumptions and inferences which are not discussed in text. Pre-four-
teenth amendment cases, all involving state laws and therefore not due process issues, are 
discussed in note 59 supra . Occasionally the Court will speak of a "presumption" in a case 
that does not involve a presumption but merely an implicit legislative judgment. See Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92-93 (1934); Allen, 
supra note 62, at 57-61. 
Criminal cases: In Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904) , a presumption that posses-
sion of a policy slip was knowing possession was upheld because "policy slips are property of 
an unusual character and not likely, particularly in large quantities, to be found in the posses-
sion of innocent parties." Id. at 599. The phrase " large quantities" referred to the evidence, 
which showed defendant possessed 3500 slips, but the quoted language as a whole ("property 
of an unusual character'') shows a facial or general long-run consideration of the presump-
tion. 
In Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), a statute providing that failure of a person 
who enters an employment contract to perform the contract or to refund money or pay for 
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cases all test the device in question facially, with the exception of two 
property obtained under the contract was "prima facie" evidence of fraud was held to violate 
the 13th amendment on its face. Id. at 239-45. A similar statute was voided facially in Taylor 
v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942). In Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944), the Court held that 
a guilty plea did not waive the right to attack yet another similar presumption. 
In McFarland v. American Sugar Co. , 241 U.S. 79 (1916), a criminal presumption that a 
local refiner who systematically paid less for sugar within the state than he paid out of the 
state is a party to a monopoly or conspiracy in restraint of trade was struck down facially as 
having "no relation in experience to general facts." Id. at 86. 
In Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. I (1922), a presumption that a person in actual possession 
of premises on which a still is found has knowledge of the still was upheld. The Court pointed 
out that distilling is not an ordinary incident of a farm, and that in a prohibition state a still 
has an illicit character and is not so silent and obscure that one who rented a farm would 
probably be ignorant of it. The Court pointed to facts in the record, such as that the still was 
within 300 yards of defendant's house and that smoke rising from the still could have been 
seen from the house. Hence the presumption was likely being upheld as applied to the facts 
of the case. The reference to ordinary incidents of a farm also demonstrates an applied analy-
sis, since there are premises, such as forest land, which would be less likely to support the 
deduction. The reference to a prohibition state is not an applied analysis because the Geor-
gian statute could only be applied in Georgia. 
In Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925), opium for smoking was presumed to 
have been imported illegally, and possession of such opium was made sufficient evidence by 
statute to find that the possessor knew it was so imported. The Court found it "not an illogi-
cal inference that opium, found in this country more than four years (in the present case, 
more than fourteen years) after its importation had been prohibited, was unlawfully im-
ported. . . . Legitimate possession, unless for medicinal use, is so highly improbable" that it 
is reasonable to put the burden of proof on the possessor of importation and knowledge. Id. at 
184. As the Court did not rely upon the time period disclosed by the facts, but upon the 
period between the ban on importation and the effective date of the enacted presumption, the 
presumptions were examined on their face. 
Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925), upheld a presumption that property taken in 
the name of a person other than the alien who is to pay for it was taken with intent to avoid 
escheat under the Alien Land Law. The Court said the deduction is not fanciful, arbitrary, or 
unreasonable, without referring to the facts of the case. Id. at 261. 
In Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928), a statute provided that the absence of tax 
stamps from narcotics is "prima facie" evidence the drugs were purchased not in or from an 
original stamped package. The law was upheld on the grounds of "rational connection" be-
tween the basic and presumed facts , and a possessor's superior access to evidence on the issue. 
Id. at 418. The Court did not rely on the facts of the case, that defendant, a lawyer, delivered 
morphine-soaked towels to jailed clients. The Court did say, however, that defendant "can-
not complain of the statute except as it affects him." Id. 
Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. I (1929), struck down a statute presuming that every bank 
insolvency is a fraud committed by the president and directors. The Court considered the 
deduction unreasonable without referring to the facts of the case. Id. at 7. 
In Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), the Court struck down a presumption that 
land recorded in a son's name is held for the benefit of the father if the father is ineligible for 
citizenship. The Court held that the equal protection clause was violated by the presump-
tion, which petitioner had challenged "as it has been applied in this case." Id. at 635. The 
Court's examination of the device as applied was therefore compelled by the petitioner's posi-
tion. 
In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), a criminal statute provided that citation 
of an organization by the United States attorney general, United States Subversive Activities 
Control Board, or a committee or subcommittee of Congress, as a Communist-front organiza-
tion, is prima facie evidence of the truth of the characterization. The Court struck down the 
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criminal and two civil cases. But those decisions involved presumptions, 
statute on its face for failure to comply with procedural safeguards necessary to insure ration-
ality. 
In Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973), a presumption that every witness speaks the 
truth was upheld in a criminal case without reference to the particulars of the case. 
In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), the Court struck down a "presumption" of 
malice aforethought from the fact of a homicide being intentional and unlawful; the rationale 
was not irrationality but impermissible shifting of the burden of proof to defendant. See 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215-16 (1977). Bui see Allen, mp,a note 62, at 57-61. 
In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, the Court voided a presumption instruction 
that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts. The ground of invalid-
ity was that the jury might have interpreted the instruction as creating either a "conclusive 
presumption" or a burden of persuasion-shifting presumption. 
Civil cases: Note 59 mp,a discusses cases involving the presumption of regularity of tax 
sale proceedings. 
In Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U .S. 35 (1910), a presump-
tion that damage caused by the running of a train is negligently inflicted, was upheld as 
applied to a derailment. Id. at 43-44. 
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), upheld a presumption that 
" makes proof of certain designated facts p,ima facie but not conclusive evidence of the com-
mon source of the waters and of the injurious effect of the pumping." Id. at 82. The Court 
upheld the presumption facially. Id. at 83. 
In Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913), a presumption that a naturalized citizen 
who takes up permanent residence in another country within five years of naturalization did 
not intend to become a permanent citizen of the United States was facially upheld: "five 
years . . . seems long, (but not] excessive or unreasonable." Id. at 27. The Court also noted 
that the intervening time on the facts of the case was short, and as "so construed, we think the 
provision is not in excess of the power of Congress." Id. 
In Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917), a presumption that an employer who has 
rejected a workers' compensation plan is the negligent cause of his employee's injury at work 
was held facially "not reasonable." Id. at 213-14. 
In James-Dickenson Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119 (1927), a presumption that a promise 
involving real estate or stock which was not complied with was fraudulently made was upheld 
as rational on its face. 
In Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928) , a statute providing that bank directors of an 
insolvent or failing bank that accepts deposits prima facie know of and assent to those depos-
its was facially upheld because the legislature could have made the directors liable to deposi-
tors in every case where a bank accepts deposits while insolvent. Id. at 94. 
In Western & Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929), a presumption that a 
railroad is negligent if it causes damage was struck down in a collision case because "(t]he 
mere fact of collision . . . furnishes no basis for any inference as to . . . negligence . . . . " Id. 
at 642-43. This is "as applied" language. 
In Bandini Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931), a statute providing that release of 
natural gas is prima facie unreasonable waste was upheld because of the "manifest connec-
tion" between the basic and presumed facts "in the present case," the Court making no refer-
ence in this portion of its opinion to the facts of the case. Id. at 18-19. As the sentences prior 
to the words "in the present case" discussed the general rules of validity of presumptions, "in 
the present case" probably was a reference to the statute, not the facts, so the presumption 
was passed upon facially. 
In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ford, 287 U.S. 502 (1933), a presumption that illegal 
failure to ring a train bell is the proximate cause of any collision and injury at a railroad 
crossing was facially upheld. Id. at 508-09. 
In Anderson Nat'! Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944), a presumption of abandonment 
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and do not support the A/Im Court's claim that inferences are tested as 
applied. 
The "l+esumptz'on ,, Cases 
The A/Im Court cited four precedents as involving presumptions, 
and therefore facial validity. The cases indeed tested devices on their 
face, but the devices arguably were all instructed as inferences. 
In Tot v. United States 11 the Court struck down a statute which pro-
vided that possession of a firearm or ammunition by one who had been 
convicted of a crime of violence or was a fugitive was presumptive evi-
dence that the possessed item had been received in interstate com-
merce.72 The record shows the trial judge read the statute to the jury, 
referred to it as a presumption, and spoke of whether defendant's evi-
dence "met" the presumption. Crucially, though, the judge added that 
"you must determine whether or not that presumption plus the other 
evidence" was sufficient to establish that the firearm was received in 
commerce. 73 The Supreme Court called the device a presumption but 
also said the jury was free to act on the statute. 74 
Probably the jury would not understand the trial judge's confused 
charge, but the Court seemingly classified the statute as an inference, 
of bank deposits after various periods of inactivity in accounts was upheld as not being with-
out "support in experience." Id. at 241. 
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 201 (1963), Justice Harlan, dissenting, 
reached an issue not considered by the Court, and said "we are concerned here only with the 
presumption (that failure to comply with compulsory military service laws shows that depar-
ture from this country was for the purpose of evading service] as applied in /his instance . . .. 
[I)t is no answer to suggest that in ollzn- instances application of the presumption might be 
unconstitutional." No reasons or authority for this proposition were offered. 
In Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), a rule that membership in an organiza-
tion which advocates forcible overthrow of the government shall be prima facie evidence that 
the member so advocates was upheld because the " 'generality of experience' (did not point) 
to a different conclusion." Id. at 495. 
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), a statute providing that Commu-
nist Party membenhip is prima facie evidence of advocacy of forceful overthrow of the gov-
ernment was held to "suffer from impermissible overbreadth" under the lint amendment. Id. 
at 609. 
Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (1976), facially upheld a presumption that an applicant 
for welfare who files within 75 days of quitting his job quit in order to obtain welfare benefits. 
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), facially upheld presumptions 
that a coalminer with ten years' employment who has contracted pneumoconiosis got the 
disease from employment, and that a coalminer who dies from a respiratory disease died from 
pneumoconiosis. Id. at 28-30. 
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980), facially upheld a presumption that an act of 
expatriation is done voluntarily. 
71 319 U.S. 463 (1943) . 
72 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1938) (repealed 1968). 
73 Record at 40, 41, 43, Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) . 
74 319 U.S. at 466-67. 
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since it referred to the jury's "freedom." Justice Roberts held the statute 
invalid for being inconsistent with experience. He did not attempt to 
bolster the statutory deduction by using the trial evidence, but the evi-
dence was not particularly helpful to the Government in any case. 75 
Roberts referred to "common experience," the "circumstances of life as 
we know them," and "mere possession."76 This is the language of gener-
alization, so the Court clearly was examining the device on its face. 
In United States v. Romano 77 the Court struck down a statute which 
deemed evidence that defendant was at the site of an illegal still to be 
sufficient to authorize conviction for possession, custody, or control of 
the still. 78 (The statute excepted defendants who explain their presence 
"to the satisfication of the jury;" this common proviso will be discussed 
below. 79) The jury was told the difference between an inference and a 
presumption, and the judge read the statute, including its caption: 
"Presumptions--Unregistered Stills."80 The Supreme Court called the 
device an inference, stating that the jury may have disbelieved the other 
evidence of possession and given the instruction "considerable 
weight."81 The Court's characterization seems correct, given the key 
word in the instruction "authorize." It is possible a jury would think 
they must do that which they are "authorized" to do, but the ordinary 
sense of the word tips the scales in favor of juror interpretation of the 
statute as permissive.82 Certainly the judge did not say the jury must 
convict if presence is proven, absent a satisfactory explanation. 
Writing for the Court, Justice White discussed the significance of 
presence at a still in general, without considering the particulars of the 
defendant's situation. Concluding that many individuals who serve 
functions requiring them to be present at a still do not possess or control 
the still, Justice White held the statute void. His approach was clearly 
facial. 
In Leary v. United States 83 the Court struck down a statute authoriz-
ing conviction for transporting or concealing marijuana known to have 
been illegally imported, upon proof of possession of marijuana.84 The 
75 One defendant purchased his gun in 1933 or 1934; it had been shipped interstate after 
being manufactured in 1919. Id. at 464-p5. The other defendant possessed his gun in 1941; it 
had been manufactured prior to 1920, and some of his ammunition had been manufactured 
in Germany, while other ammunition was made in Ohio after 1934. Id. at 465. 
76 Id. at 467-68. 
77 382 U.S. 136 (1965). 
78 I.R.C. § 560l(b)(l) (1954) (repealed 1976). &e also § 560l(a)(l) . 
79 &e note 105 & text following note l 72 infra. 
80 Record at 95, 100, United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) . 
81 382 U.S. at 138-39. 
82 &e WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 146 (3d ed. 1971). 
83 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
84 21 U.S.C. § l 76(a) (1956) (repealed 1970). 
102 PETER LUSHING (Vol. 72 
trial judge had read and paraphrased the statute for the jury.85 Justice 
Harlan, writing for the Court, termed the statute a presumption, but he 
seemingly used that term to refer to devices which authorize infer-
ences,86 and the Court in a subsequent case read Leary as involving an 
inference.87 If the Romano analysis above is correct as to what "author-
ize" means to a jury, then this characterization is accurate. 
Justice Harlan, in Leary, said that he would consider the validity of 
the statute "in the circumstances of this case."88 This is validity-as-ap-
plied language. But Justice Harlan surveyed what a majority of mari-
juana possessors have learned of the foreign origin of their marijuana.89 
After examining the data, Justice Harlan found that a "significant per-
centage" of the drug in America may not have been imported, so that it 
could no longer be postulated that possessors are even roughly aware of 
the proportion actually imported.90 This, of course, is a general, or fa-
cial, analysis of validity. The statutory deduction was held void because 
it was not more likely true than false, without reference to the facts of 
the case.91 
Finally, in Turner v. United States 92 the Court upheld a Leary-type 
statute regarding heroin but struck it down as to cocaine.93 (As in Ro-
mano, the Leary and Turner statutes contained exceptions for defendants 
who produce "satisfactory explanations.") The trial judge read the stat-
ute to the jury and referred to it as a presumption.94 The Court called 
the statute an inference (again, a reasonable characterization consider-
ing the statutory term "authorize") and said that the jury was obligated 
by the instructions to assess for itself the weight, if any, to be accorded 
the statutory deduction.95 
How was the statute reviewed-facially or as applied? Justice 
White's opinion for the Court contains ambiguous statements in the ab-
stract, so it is best to concentrate on what he did.96 Examination of the 
85 Appendix 97a-98a, 103a-04a, Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6. 
86 395 U .S. at 29, 31, 32-33 n.56. 
87 Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 403 (1970). 
88 395 U.S. at 29. 
89 Id. at 52. 
90 Id. at 46. 
91 Id. at 36 & n.4. One theory of guilt submitted to the jury was the inference plus the 
evidence that the defendant had transported the marijuana from New York to Texas. Id. at 
31. 
92 396 U.S. 398 (1970). 
93 21 U .S.C. § 174 (1964) (repealed 1970). 
94 Record at 15, 16, 21, Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) . 
95 396 U.S. at 407. 
96 Justice White said that the jury might have used its own knowledge, or lacking infor-
mation, may have convicted in reliance on the inference, perhaps reasoning that the statute 
represented an official determination. Id. at 407. If the jury used its own knowledge or ac-
cepted the statute as "official," then the evidence could not have played a role and the review 
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data showed that heroin in this country is almost beyond question im-
ported. This is facial, since there was no data introduced at trial. But 
Justice White also pointed to Turner as doubtlessly knowing his heroin 
was imported because sellers are in a class apart.97 Turner had been 
caught with 275 glassine envelopes of heroin, so this seems to be validity-
as-applied to the facts of the case. Justice White did not explain how 
the jury could use Turner's expertise. While Turner's status as a seller 
appeared from the evidence, nothing of his knowledge of a fact not in 
evidence (importation) could be deduced by jurors. In no Allen sense 
then was the inference justified as applied, that is, by examining the 
sufficiency of the evidence, as jurors would, to see if the verdict could be 
reached without accepting the instructions in the abstract. Moreover, 
Justice White upheld the inference as applied to users who frequently 
purchase heroin at retail, as they also would know the source of heroin.98 
Nearly all possessors of heroin are either sellers or frequent users, so Jus-
tice White virtually had exhausted the range of possible applications of 
the statute-another way of upholding the statute on its face. 
The Court next turned to Turner's conviction for knowing posses-
sion of imported cocaine. Importantly, neither the Turner nor Allen 
Courts considered that testing the statute separately for heroin and for 
cocaine implied that the statute was being tested as applied. The trial 
judge had told the jury that the statutory term "narcotic drugs" covers 
heroin and cocaine; thus no opportunity arose for the jury to apply the 
statute to each drug and determine whether the inference was justified 
depending upon the drug in question. 99 
Because this country legally produces more cocaine than is smug-
gled in, and because enough of the domestic product is stolen to dispel 
would thus be facial. But Justice White also said "the question on review is the sufficiency of 
the evidence." Id. This sounds like a validity-as-applied analysis. But he added to the last 
quote, "the soundness of inferring guilt from proof of possession alone." Id. This sounds like 
facial validity again. 
97 Id. at 416. 
98 Id. at 417 n.33. 
99 The trial judge charged that heroin and cocaine were narcotic drugs within the statute. 
Record at 14, 17, Turner v. United S~ates, 396 U.S. 398. The jury thus was presented with 
two inferences, one in terms of heroin and one about cocaine, just as if separate statutes were 
being used in two trials. The trial judge's interpretation of the statute with resultant bifurca-
tion into two inferences logically and chronologically preceded any "application" of the in-
structions by the factfinder. In determining the statute's validity, given this bifurcated 
instruction, a reviewing court would have to premise that the inference is triggered by both 
heroin and cocaine eo nomine, not that it is triggered by "narcotic drugs" and might therefore 
be valid as applied to for example, heroin but not to cocaine. Constructions of a statute 
become the terms of the statute itself for constitutional purposes. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 
337 U.S. 1 (1949); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Therefore, if the statute 
were struck down because it is irrational when cocaine is being considered, that would be 
striking it down facially, not as applied. 
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any conclusion that a possessor probably knows his cache has been im-
ported, the inference as to cocaine was voided. This analysis is undoubt-
edly facial, but significantly Justice White did not reject the 
government's argument that the inference might be valid for possessors 
of much larger amounts than Turner. By leaving this possibility 
open, 100 Justice White arguably voided the inference only as applied to 
small possessors. Still the inescapable conclusion is that a jury would 
not know of a large possessor's expertise on the source of large amounts 
of cocaine, absent evidence, not simply of large possession, but of the 
origin of large amounts. As the government's argument for large posses-
sors did not include a possible showing of the origin of large amounts at 
trial, again the inference in a "large" case would depend upon facts ex-
traneous to the evidence, not upon an Allen jury evaluation of the evi-
dence. 
Tiu "Inference" Cases 
The Allen Court cited three decisions as involving inferences, and 
therefore testing validity only as applied. The cases do indeed deal with 
inferences, but all were tested on their face. 
In Barnes v. United States IOI the Court upheld a common law infer-
ence that from the fact of possession of recently stolen property the pos-
sessor knows that the property is stolen, absent a satisfactory 
explanation. Unlike the cases discussed previously, the inference here 
was charged in terms of the evidence-the instructions offered the de-
duction of knowledge in the "light of the surrounding circumstances 
shown by the evidence in the case," and pointed out that the longer the 
period of time elapsing between the theft and possession, the more 
doubtful the inference. But Justice Powell for the Court, after charac-
terizing the device as an inference that juries may draw, performed the 
classical facial examination: he considered the history of the infer-
ence. l02 Even though the instruction incorporated the evidence by ref-
erence, the Court looked at the inference as a generalization. 
Due process requires a testing in the light of present day experience, 
Justice Powell continued. He stated that on the basis of the evidence 
alone common sense and experience supported an inference of the de-
fendant's guilty knowledge. l03 This sounds like a departure from the 
historical facial analysis, tending rather toward an application to the 
evidence. But since the prior thought had been of "present day experi-
100 396 U.S. at 418-19. Justice White found in "unnecessary" to deal with the argument. 
Id. at 419 n.39. 
IOI 412 U.S. 837 (1973). 
102 Id. at 838, 843-44, 846 n.11. 
103 Id. at 845. 
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ence," the reference to the evidence at trial may be seen as an alterna-
tive holding to validity, that is, even without the inference the jury 
would have found scienter. This reading is reinforced by Powell's ex-
pression "on the basis of the evidence alone;" the word "alone" appears 
to distinguish this line of reasoning from one upholding the verdict on 
the basis of the instructed inference. Moreover, the evidence against 
Barnes was plentiful, 104 yet Powell said that the practical effect of the 
instruction shifted the burden of going forward to defendant. 105 Had 
Justice Powell viewed the inference not facially but as applied, he more 
naturally would have pointed to the inference combined with the evi-
dence as shifting the burden to Barnes. 106 
Turner, discussed above, also had the misfortune of being convicted 
under a statute prohibiting purchasing, selling, dispensing, or distribut-
ing narcotic drugs except in or from the original stamped package. 107 
The jury was read a statute which provided that the absence of stamps 
from possessed drugs shall be "prima facie" evidence of guilt of the pos-
sessor. 108 Once again the Court upheld the statute as to heroin but 
struck it down as to cocaine.109 
104 Barnes had opened a checking account pscudonymously a month before he endorsed 
four government checks made out to different individuals; these all bore forged prior endorse-
ments to the pseudonym, some of which, an expert testified, were Barnes' handiwork. Barnes' 
out-of-court explanation for all this bordered on the preposterous. Id. at 838-39. 
105 Id. at 846 n.11. Herc Justice Powell was beginning to discuss the "satisfactory explana-
tion" component of the inference, which tells the jury it may not infer culpability given a 
satisfactory explanation of the basic fact by defendant. This common phrase appears in Ro-
mano, Leary, Tumn and Cain,y, all discussed in text. 
Arguably the "satisfactory explanation" component is redundant on the theory that a 
jury would not first draw the inference if they had a countervailing satisfactory explanation. 
&~ United States v. Johnson, 515 F.2d 730, 732-33 n.7 (7th Cir. 1975). This reasoning ig-
nores the possibility that a universal inference might encourage the jury to convict on a gener-
alization; having accepted a generalized inference, what might otherwise be a satisfactory 
explanation of defendant 's conduct might not be convincing enough to cause rejection of the 
generalization. Also, the jury might not have required a satisfactory explanation to begin 
with had it not been afforded a generalized inference of guilt; it simply might not have in-
ferred culpability from the evidence at the outset. 
Does the fact that an instructed inference has a "satisfactory explanation" component-
and therefore necessitates incorporation of the evidence-mean that such inferences arc al-
ways judged as applied? Given the above analysis of the nonrcdundancy of that component, 
it would seem not. 
106 Arguably the fact that the Bar,us charge referred to the surrounding circumstances, 
meant that the instruction should have been reviewed as applied. But Justice Powell consid-
ered the history of the guilty-knowledge inference; he did not view the validity of the instruc-
tion as dependent upon the evidence in the case. Dissenting in A/Im, Justice Powell wrote 
that the Bar,us inference was "well founded in history, common sense, and experience, and 
therefore upheld .... " 442 U.S. at 172. 
107 I.R.C. § 4704(a) (1954) (repealed 1970). 
108 Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. at 402, 420; Record at 18, id. 
109 This did not mean that the Court reviewed the statute as applied as the trial judge told 
the jury the statute covered heroin and cocaine. Record at 19, id. ; see note 99 supra . 
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What a jury would make of the operative term "prima facie" is 
unknowable. Justice White called the device a presumption, 110 but also 
said the statute "authorize[s] an inference of guilt. " 111 His and the Allen 
Court's characterization of the case as involving an inference can be ac-
cepted for purposes of testing Allen's categorization of the precedents, for 
the device was tested on its face. Justice White first viewed the inference 
as playing no role in the case because of plentiful evidence of distribu-
tion of heroin. 11 2 Alternatively he assumed that the evidence did not 
show distribution, in which case the jury's use of the inference was as-
sumed and had to be judged. 
Justice White found the "bare fact" of possession of heroin insuffi-
cient to infer distribution or sale, so the inference could not be used for 
those acts. 113 The "bare fact," of course, is the language of facial valid-
ity. But, Justice White continued, the inference was not invalid as to 
purchase because undoubtedly possessors have purchased their heroin, 
and no one purchases from a stamped package, stamps for heroin not 
being issued by the government. 114 Here again Justice White was not 
relying on the evidence to uphold this deduction. 
As for the cocaine count, enough cocaine is stolen from legal, 
stamped channels, to infer a high possibility that a possessor purchased 
from a stamped package. Hence, the cocaine inference was invalid. 
Again, as no trial evidence indicated the source of Turner's cocaine, Jus-
tice White examined the inference facially. He did look to the amount 
of cocaine Turner possessed in concluding that the inference was "criti-
cal" to the case. 115 He did this to demonstrate the necessity of passing 
upon the validity of the inference-not to determine the validity of the 
inference. 
In Umted States v. Gainey 116 the Court held a jury could draw an 
inference of the operation of an illegal distilling business from mere pres-
ence at the site of a still. 117 The judge had charged that such presence 
was a circumstance to consider on guilt, but added that a statute pro-
vided that presence was itself sufficient to convict, absent a satisfactory 
explanation. 118 
110 396 U .S. at 421, 424. 
111 Id. at 400. 
112 Id. at 420. Justice White's analysis should be compared with that in United States v. 
Allen discussed in text accompanying note 31 supra . 
11 3 396 U.S. at 421. 
114 Id. at 422. 
115 Id. at 423. 
t 16 380 U.S. 63 (1965). 
t 17 I.R.C. § 5601(b) ; see I.R.C. § 5601(a)(4) . 
118 380 U.S. at 69-70. The A/Im Court said the Gainey charge involved an inference be-
cause the judge had said presence was only a circumstance to be considered, whereas Romano, 
1981] CRIMINAL INFERENCES 107 
Justice Stewart for the Court saw this authorization statute as al-
lowing an inference. 119 Congress' purpose in enacting the device was to 
mediate a dispute among the courts of appeals as to what to tell the jury 
about the weight afforded to presence, and represented the legislative 
resolution in favor of including the inference in jury instructions. 120 The 
statute, Justice Stewart said, only confirms what the folklore teaches 
about persons near a still. 121 Justice Stewart's analysis was not about 
particular cases, but the general problem of presence-a classical facial 
analysis. He added Congress had merely accorded the evidence its natu-
ral probative force. 122 Surely Justice Stewart was not referring to the 
evidence in Gainey's case, where the defendant had driven up to the still 
in a swamp with darkened headlights and fled when confronted by reve-
nue agents. Congress could not have been anticipating Gainey's misad-
venture. So Justice Stewart's analysis rigidly adhered to the face of the 
statute. 
B. APPLICATION OF AN INFERENCE: A SQUARED CIRCLE 
The Allen Court's test for validity of an instructed inference-appli-
cation of the inference by determining the sufficiency of the trial evi-
dence of one fact to prove the inferred fact-is based on a false model 
and avoids the constitutional problem presented by a given inference. 
This is so of the usual instructed inference, which is in general terms, not 
in terms of the evidence. In Allen the trial judge spoke about occupancy 
of an automobile, not occupancy as demonstrated by the evidence. The 
typical instructed inference is not meant to be applied, nor can it be 
applied. 
Umversals and Particulars 
To appreciate why the nature of an instructed generalized infer-
ence makes its application an impossibility, it is necessary to consider 
the difference between universals and particulars. 123 Baseball, for exam-
ple, can be discussed in terms of characteristics of the game and its plays 
discussed in text accompanying notes 77-82 supra, involved facial testing because the judge 
had said presence was sufficient evidence to convict. 442 U.S. at 158-59 n .16. Actually, the 
Gainey judge also charged presence was sufficient to convict, 380 U.S. at 69-70. Furthermore, 
such an instruction is not that of a presumption, requiring facial testing, but of an inference, 
because the trial judge in reading the statute stated that presence is sufficient to authorize 
conviction. &e note 82 supra. 
119 380 U.S. at 64. 
120 Id. at 66. 
121 Id. at 67-68. 
!22 Id. at 71 (quoting McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U.S. 520, 525 (1913)). 
123 The discussion here is about language, not metaphysics, so no allegiance to theories 
reifying ideas is implied. &e gmnal(J, Woozley, Vniwrsals, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
194, 203 (P. Edwards ed. 1972). 
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(the game is boring; this is how to execute a squeeze play), or in terms of 
examples (third game of last year's World Series, Maris' sixty-first home 
run). When a term is used generally, referring to a concept, the term is a 
universal; when the term refers to an example, it is a particular. The 
discussion of baseball in the general sense can proceed without reference 
to particular real or fictitious games, as in "baseball is slow-moving. " A 
discussion in terms of particulars refers to concrete examples, as in "that 
double-play was almost balletic." 
Rules of law are made of words. Their generality of purpose-the 
intended use of the rules in an infinite number of cases--shows that 
their terms are universal in nature. 124 Of course the rules are meant for 
application to particulars, the facts of cases. But the terms in the rules 
are not about a particular case, but all acts which fall within their 
sweep. Thus a burglary statute is not about entry without permission 
into the house at 142 Third Avenue, but about the concept of entry into 
premises without authority. Causes of action, crimes, defenses, and the 
rest of the legal galaxy are about ideas; how these ideas are used in trials 
is at the core of the Allen problem. 
Take the application of a substantive rule: " If A, then B (a legal 
consequence)," where A is negligence and the consequence is liability 
for damages caused thereby. A is a concept, a universal, which the 
factfinder will be asked to apply to a particular-the defendant's con-
duct. To insure in some measure that the jury obeys the law, the trial 
judge will not send the case to it unless there is a possibly rational ap-
praisal of the evidence that could lead to a conclusion of negligence. To 
further decrease the possibility of jury lawlessness, the judge will define 
negligence, ideally with the help of examples. The jury determines 
whether the evidence shows an example of negligence and returns its 
verdict without further ado once this determination is made. Finding or 
not finding negligence from the evidence is all that the jury did when it 
"applied" the substantive rule. The consequences of application of the 
rule proceed unassisted by the jury from the force of the rule itself, as-
suming that the jury obeyed its instructions. 
Now compare the use of an inference rule, commonly instructed 
not in terms of the evidence but in terms of concepts. The judges in 
most of the cases considered said "If you find A, then you may infer B," 
not "From the evidence of A, you may infer B." A is occupancy of a 
gunladen car or presence at a still, a universal, not jury-determined pres-
ence in this case, a particular. It follows that B, possession of the gun or 
carrying on the business of a distiller, proceeds in the rule, not from the 
particular evidenced at trial, but from occupancy of a gunladen car or 
124 Su Wilson, A Note on FtKI and Law , 26 Moo. L. REV. 609,615 (1963). 
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presence at a still in general. An inference instruction invites the 
factfinder to proceed not from the evidence but, once having found that 
A is instanced in the evidence, from the universal, regardless of the pe-
culiarities of the evidence. The instruction to the jury referred to the 
evidence only as a trigger for the option of the inference, not as a basis 
for exercising that option. 
If the factfinder finds A, it has not finished working with the in-
structed inference. It must still exercise or reject the option to infer B. 
Various factors, including the evidence, may influence this choice. In 
exercising the option the jury is allowed by the instruction to draw B 
not from the evidence but from the concept of A. The reason this occurs 
with instructed inferences and not with other rules is that no other rules 
linger after finding a particular of the rule's universal in the evidence 
(with the exception of a presumption, which sets the jury to the task of 
determining if it has been rebutted). Yet more work remains in the case 
of an inference. By the terms of the rule as handed down by the courts 
or enacted by the legislature, and by the terms of typical instructions, 
that work is not tied to evaluation of the evidence but to the terms of the 
rule itself. 
An instructed inference creates its own feedback, like a rule of 
renvoi: 125 the inference first refers the jury to the evidence to find A and 
then, if triggered by a finding of A, swoops the jury back up to A as a 
universal, whereupon the jury considers the option of deducing B there-
from. Noninference rules point the jury to a particular A and then, if 
triggered, sweep by the jury carrying through to the rule's consequences 
unassisted by the factfinder. 
How lnslrucled Inferences Are Used 
The Allen type of instructed inference is one instructed in terms of 
universals, not the evidence. Inferences instructed in terms of the evi-
dence do, however, have impact uponjurors. 126 An analysis of universal 
inference instructions may also apply to particularized inference instruc-
tions. The Allen Court saw the universal instruction in that case as oper-
ating like a particularized instruction. An example shows the difference 
in action between the two: the task of determining if there are at least 
one hundred fifty potatoes in a sack. The taskmaster says: 
If you find at least one hundred potatoes, then, by consideration of the 
evidenco--comparison of the bulk of the counted with the bulk of the un-
counted spuds, and of the respective weights of those bulks, examination of 
the sack, etc.-you may conclude that there are one hundred fifty potatoes 
in the sack. 
125 &e RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws § 8 (1971). 
126 This impact is examined principally in the text accompanying section V. B. in.fta. 
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Imagine having counted one hundred potatoes and thus being about to 
consider the potato evidence in light of this instruction. This is the Allen 
conception of what happened in that case. 
But suppose the taskmaster suddenly says, "On second thought, if 
you find there are one hundred, you may conclude there are one hun-
dred fifty." After hearing this, no one would weigh piles of potatoes. 
This latter instruction was actually given in Allen. It could pass consti-
tutional muster under a facial validity test if the data show that ninety-
eight percent of potato sacks containing at least one hundred potatoes in 
fact contain one hundred fifty. The Allen Court said that the data is 
irrelevant, however, so even if only two percent of the sacks containing 
one hundred contain as mariy as one hundred fifty, the Court would 
uphold the inference "as applied," providing only that there was a ra-
tional means, working with the sack, to find one hundred fifty. Of 
course there is--counting. But the jury might well not have counted. 
Thus, Allen holds that a reviewing court which acts as it thinks a jury 
should or might have acted should validate an inference which derails a 
jury from acting as it should, but under the inference did not, act . 
Arguments that the counter is "presumptively rational" 127 or sin-
cere miss the point. If befuddled, the counter will take a shortcut 
backed by the prestige of a judge or a potato taskmaster. The process of 
determining a man's guilt is not on the mechanical level of counting 
potatoes, but this argues as strongly for taking an authorized shortcut as 
it does for well-intentioned stabbing in the dark. 
Does the Allen Court think that instructed inferences play any role 
in jury deliberations? The Court was silent, but the most tempting ex-
planation to support the Allen holding is that the inference penetrates 
the facts of a case coating them with a power to imply further facts, as a 
freshly painted snake wriggling through a newspaper colors the pages. 
In this model, an inference is an expert witness who testifies about his 
field but does not give his opinion as to what happened in the case. The 
instruction is simply an indication of relevance and sufficiency. The 
jury may be puzzled about the relationship between defendant's occu-
pancy of the gunladen car and possession. The inference educates the 
jurors to the fact that, in general, possession can be found from suffi-
ciently suggestive occupancy and location of the gun. The jury hears 
this, sees the evidence in a new light, and decides whether the particu-
lars of the case imply possession, thus "applying" the inference. If the 
evidence supports the jury's deduction, the inference is valid as applied. 
The problem with this model is its dependence on an uneducated 
guess by the jurors as to the usage of the inference, thereby contradicting 
127 County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157. 
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the hypothesis of the jury as a presumptively rational factfinder. Rele-
vance instructions tell a jury that facts are significant, perhaps through 
presentation of the reason the facts are associated with other facts. In-
ference instructions tell a jury facts are sufficient, without giving reasons. 
When a judge points out relevance, he is offering advice about a prob-
lem but not a solution; when he instructs an inference, he is offering a 
solution, but no advice. No generalization about how many potatoes 
are in a sack can be evaluated by a jury to determine whether the partic-
ular sack is an instance of the general proposition. This holds true even 
if the instruction explicitly refers to the evidence, unless, as in the first 
potato instruction, a methodology of analyzing the evidence is af-
forded.128 
An inference instruction says "if you find one thing exists, you can 
deduce that another thing exists." The "things" are understood by the 
listener, but not the "deduce." How is B found from A? The inference 
instruction doesn't say, and the boilerplate in the rest of the charge 
about considering all of the evidence, the state's burden of proof and the 
presumption of innocence-all old friends whom appellate judges fre-
quently embrace to salvage a charge129--do not explain to a jury how to 
reject or accept the inference. The instructed inference is a tool without 
the accompanying instruction booklet. As it does not carry its own ex-
planation, but merely its own conclusion, it does not have the power to 
enhance the deductive ability of the jury. The inference can only be 
taken in hand or not; it can not be used in conjunction with any other 
facet of the charge. The instruction affirms the validity of the inference; 
128 Wittgenstein 's remarks on signposts are instructive: 
A rule stands there like a sign-post.-Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the 
way I have to go? Does it shew which direction I am to take when I have passed it; 
whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way 
I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one?-And 
if there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the 
ground-is there only one way of interpreting them?--So I can say, the sign-post does 
after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and 
sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical 
one. 
L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 1 85 (G. Anscombe trans. 1953). The 
more familiar we are with words and other signs and symbols, the more we tend to think their 
meaning visibly inheres in their being, like color. But of course every meaning and associa-
tion had to be learned. Nothing about an arrow explains how to understand it; the direction 
had to be shown to any given signreader at one time in his life, even if only by natural 
association between the activity of pointing with the index finger and the configuration of the 
arrow. And the meaning of finger pointing also had to be learned from a context--accompa-
nying words, activities, expressions of approval or disapproval. Whether one has learned a 
meaning is Wittgenstein's "empirical" proposition. An arrow, for example, could be inter-
preted as representing the locus of its reader at the point of the arrowhead, in which case the 
direction would be the opposite from the conventional interpretation. 
129 &e, e.g., County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 161-62. 
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it does not elucidate the process of inference. One might as well teach 
tapdancing by saying "if you stand, you can tapdance." Thus any use 
of the inference must consist of tracking the inference itself, that is, by 
going from the universal A to B. There is no lane for reasoned decision-
making on this road. This was recognized over a century ago by the 
California Supreme Court: 
To say to the jury that they would be authorized to find a fact because of 
the existence of another, is but saying, in another form, that the existence 
of the latter raises the reasonable presumption of the existence of the for-
mer, since the jury can find the former only as a presumption from the 
existence of the latter. It is a very different thing from saying that one fact 
tends to prove another. 130 
Perhaps the jury needs no guidance in how B flows from A . If an 
inference only shows jurors that, jurors' intelligence, common sense, and 
experience will show them how . 131 But if the jury can devise its own 
methods for recognizing that a given case of occupancy implies posses-
sion, then the argument contradicts the model of the inference as expert 
guidance: to tell jurors that in general (or on the evidence of this case) 
occupancy and possession are associated would be pointless superfluity. 
The Allen Court does not explain why instructed inferences have been 
created if all they do is tell the jury what it knows. If the Court thinks 
that the inference does not tell the jury anything, but only encourages 
them to reach a result, then the Court mischaracterized the jury as "free 
to credit or reject the inference." 132 A lawyer's procedural freedom is 
not the kind of freedom that is relevant here: lack of judicial pressure or 
incitement. The Court said years ago: "The very essence of [the jury's] 
function is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions 
that which it considers most reasonable." 133 To think the jurors func-
tion in a pristine manner after having heard the judge charge an infer-
ence, even one that incorporates the evidence, is naive. But the 
universal inference is worse: it encourages the jurors to reach a conclu-
sion blindly. 
Focusing on the inference as expert witness, some instructions do 
-transmit expertise, but expert knowledge, not expert ability. The Turner 
importation of heroin inference is illustrative. In that case the judge 
told the jury that possesion of heroin authorizes a finding that the heroin 
was imported and that the possessor knew it. Nothing in the evidence 
allowed the jurors to evaluate the accuracy of the generalization that 
130 Stone v. Geyser Quicksilver Mining Co., 52 Cal. 315, 318-19 (1877) . 
131 &, G. RYLE, THE CoNCEPT OF MIND 27-32 (1949) (distinction between knowing how 
and knowing that) . 
132 442 U.S. at 157. 
133 Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) . 
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heroin comes from abroad. The Allen Court saw this branch of Turner as 
a presumption, so the "application" analysis was inappropriate. 134 Jus-
tices Black and Douglas have argued forcefully that the use of an in-
struction on a presumption or an inference offends the Constitution by 
introducing unsworn "testimony." 135 The concern here is whether the 
Allen inference, which involves the comparatively commonplace--car 
riders and their possession of the objects in the car--can operate any 
differently from the esoteric Turner inference. If the Allen inference is no 
more useable by juries than the Turner inference, then the Court's model 
of the Allen jury as reasoning beings, as distinguished from the Turner 
jury as being forced to accept a presumption, is fallacious. 
If a juror can reason from the facts of Allen to a conclusion, then, as 
shown above, the inference is superfluous. If the jury cannot so reason, 
the inference does not help it to do so. If the inference is taken to be an 
expert on guns and cars, the jury is free to accept or reject it as a source 
of facts. But an expert witness is subject to cross-examination and op-
posing witnesses. By contrast, the judge instructing an inference is not 
answerable for his statements. The existence of (but not the right to 
call) 136 witnesses to the probability of possession by occupants in general 
is problematic, and attorneys cannot in their summations counter the 
instructed inference as a possible truth because it is the law. Presumably 
defense counsel could not argue to the jury that the anticipated instruc-
tion is wrong in general, or even that it could not possibly follow in the 
case on trial. Of course, he could argue why they should not draw the 
inference, but his argument is followed by the judge saying-without 
giving reasons-that the inference is possible. True, the judge also 
charges that jurors can credit or discredit expert witnesses, but those are 
people, hence obviously fallible. When the judge charges the inference, 
he does not state it is infallible, but does present a generalization obvi-
ously endorsed by the law, and gives no reason to reject it other than the 
jury's consideration of "all of the evidence." Why should the jury reject 
what the law has seemingly found generally accurate? Even evidence 
tending to show that defendant did not possess the gun hardly qualifies 
as expert evidence against the inference, because such evidence does not 
disprove the long-run accuracy of the generalization, and especially not 
in the one trial in which the jury has heard the inference charged despite 
the receipt of such evidence. 137 
t34 442 U .S. at 157-58. 
135 See note 63 supra . 
136 See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 409 (1970). 
137 Alim itself involved acquittal for items in the trunk of the car despite the instruction of 
the inference, but the verdict could have been the result of compromise, as the Chief Justice 
opined. 442 U .S. at 167 (concurring opinion). 
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Although the Allen Court offered no explanation of how an infer-
ence operates, the majority did say that the jury, being free to draw or 
not to draw the inference as it saw fit, must be deemed to have made a 
rational choice when the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of the 
inferred fact. It is as if the evidence is a governor on the use of the 
inference. 138 That the evidence is a governor does not preclude use of 
the instruction as a generalization apart from the particularities of the 
evidence. Suppose a jury were told that, if a golf ball is known to be at 
least partially white, it may infer the ball is entirely white. Now a juror 
could conclude on the basis of evidence that a partially visible ball 
looked white that the ball was entirely white as a matter of experience 
and common sense. Still, another juror could have his doubts. Turning 
to the instructed inference, the doubting juror could resolve his puzzle-
ment merely on the ground that the jJidge has furnished him with a 
generalization. This juror uses the generalization, not the highly proba-
tive evidence, to reach this conclusion. 
The Court's validation of the inference depends upon whether it 
finds sufficient evidence to reach the inferred fact rationally. Appellate 
review of sufficiency of the evidence normally assumes that the jury has 
squeezed the evidence dry. 139 This assumption is grounded in adminis-
trative and policy considerations, not a belief of judges that juries actu-
ally evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict 
winner. There is simply no other assumption to make, given the secret 
nature and the sovereignty of the jury deliberations, and the impossibil-
ity of applying any other assumption. Why should the hypothesis of the 
"efficient" jury prevail when the trial judge has commented on the evi-
dence by instructing an inference? That the jury followed the sugges-
tion in the instruction is as probable as that it independently evaluated 
the evidence. It is not that the jury had no choice whether to infer. The 
problem is not that the jury accepts the invitation of the instruction in 
138 The court is not clear whether the evidence it measures when determining the validity 
of the inference as applied is all the evidence pointing toward the inferred fact, or just the 
evidence of the basic fact in the instructed inference. The Court spoke of "the connection 
permitted by the inference" under the facts of the case, id. at 157, in its general discussion of 
presumptions versus inferences. But when it passed upon the validity of the A/Im inference, 
the Court referred to evidence of a knife carried by the owner of the handbag to show the 
rationality of deducing that she was not the sole custodian of the guns. Id. at 164. This knife 
is not a constituent of the basic facts of occupancy of a gunladen car. One could stretch a bit 
and fit the knife into the basic fact of "occupancy," as in "occupancy of a car in that the 
defendant sat in a car near a girl with a knife." 
If the Court actually intended that evidence other than that proving the predicate facts 
can be taken into account in passing on the validity of the inference, then it is virtually 
impossible to determine what the Court believes is the operation of the instructed inference. 
139 Su, e.g. , United States v. Tutino, 269 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir. 1959) (take the evidence in 
the view most favorable to the government when defendant challenges sufficiency to convict). 
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the face of unpersuasive evidence, but that the jury might shirk its duty 
to evaluate the evidence given the instruction. Rather than being a gov-
ernor on the use of the inference, the evidence might merely conspire 
against blind use of the inference, with the problematic chance of suc-
cess typical of conspiracies. If the Allen Court was implying that the 
jury's intelligence is the principal brake on indiscriminate use of an in-
structed inference, then the Court has made the jury, not the judges, the 
arbiters of the validity of such instructions. 
C. FACIAL VALIDITY OF CRIMINAL INFERENCES AS AN INESCAPABLE 
ISSUE 
Paradoxically, the more irrational the instructed inference is, the 
less likely it is to cause harm, as the jurors will tend to see it for an 
absurdity and ignore it. The seductive inference, however, such as the 
gun-in-the-car, cries out for professional confirmation (as is required of 
presumptions) lest defendants be convicted for being at the scene of a 
crime. If the analysis above on the operation of inferences is incorrect, 
still nobody knows for sure how they work, so the hypothesis should be 
that they can exert control over juries. Facial validity is a requirement, 
then, for rational criminal procedure. 
The Supreme Court has not enunciated a unified theory of facial 
validity-why that issue is reached in some cases and not in others. 
That constitutional questions should be avoided is fundamental consti-
tutional jurisprudence. A corollary of this doctrine is to decide unavoid-
able constitutional questions on the narrowest possible grounds. 140 Yet 
since Marbury v. Madison, 141 the court has held statutes to be "void," de-
spite the inevitably present narrower ground of decision that the statute 
is unconstitutional as applied. 142 There are pockets of constitutional 
law, first amendment overbreadth,143 and void-for-vagueness 144 which 
doctrinally require that the facial validity of statutes be passed upon. 
Yet the Court has considered facial attacks based upon grounds which 
do not involve the face of the statute. 145 
140 Su Ashwander v. Tenncsscc Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) . 
141 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) . 
142 If a statute is the expression of a universal rule, then Chief Justice Marshall was correct 
in Marbury as a matter of formal logic. Universal propositions arc logically invalidated by a 
single disconfirming instance; one black swan voids "all swans arc white." 
143 See Note, Tiu First Ammdmmt Over6readtlt Doctn'ne , 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 852-58 (1970). 
144 See Amsterdam, Tlte Vo,ii-for-Vagunuss Doctn'ne in the Suprmu Court , 109 U . PA. L. REV. 
67, 96-97, 109 n.224 (1960) . 
145 See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U .S. I (1979); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Scrv., 433 
U.S. 425, 439 (1977) ; United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 
U .S. 41 , 64 (1967) ; New York v. O 'Neill, 359 U.S. I, 8 (1959) ; Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. 
Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 275 (1940) ; Great N. Ry. v. Washington, 300 U .S. 154, 161-62 
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A holding that a statute is unconstitutional on its face implies that 
the statute can be allowed effect in no case, as applied to any facts. 146 A 
holding that a statute is unconstitutional as applied implies that the 
conduct disclosed by the facts of the case is protected from the conse-
quences which the statute would attach to that conduct. 147 Holdings of 
facial and applied validity vel non have in common the fashioning of a 
constitutional rule with the following structure: "If A, then legal conse-
quences (liability, criminality, subjection to judicial jurisdiction, etc.) 
(may) (may not) follow." In facial holdings, A represents the terms of 
the statute; in applied holdings, A represents the facts of the case. A 
complete collection of these rules, as garnered from all decisions, past 
and future, comprises that "legal code" Justice Marshall did not find 
explicit in the Constitution. 148 
A constitutional rule on the facial validity of an instructed infer-
ence has this structure: "If 'if A, then B,' (is) (is not) (beyond a reason-
able doubt, or some lesser standard) true, then the jury (may) (may not) 
(1937); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Wuchtcr v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 
(1928); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); United States v. Rccsc, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). 
146 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,474 (1974); see United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 
427, 439 (1896). See a/so I SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 2.06 
(C. Sands rev. 1972). Compare Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944) (guilty plea under 
facially invalid statute is void), with Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (pica is 
valid) . Oddly, the Court once held a statute to be facially void and then proceeded to decide 
if it was valid as applied. Apthckcr v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964). 
A holding that a statute is unconstitutional as construed is a category of facial invalidity, 
because the interpretation of a statute, whether by appellate court, see Stromberg v. Califor-
nia, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), or by trial judge instructing thcjury,see Tcrminicllo v. Chicago, 337 
U.S. I (1949), is functionally equivalent to the words of the statute themselves. 
147 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (per curiam) Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371,379 (1971); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & 
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 590-91 (2d ed. 1973). 
The role a statute plays in a holding of void-as-applied is one of exemplification: the 
statute stands in for all possible rules that sweep in the protected conduct and attach similar 
consequences. Cf H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 531 (1st ed. 1953) (discussing the importance of the particular facts as found in deter-
mining as-applied invalidity). This generalization may seem too much to accept for cases in 
which constitutionality is challenged, not as violative of the Bill of Rights, but because the 
statute was enacted without authority, that is, outside of Congress's Article I powers or 
outside a state's subject matter jurisdiction, or in cases where the statute conflicts with judicial 
subject jurisdictional limits as in Mar6,uy itself. The generalization that the conduct is held 
protected when a statute is voided as applied can be saved in these cases by construing the 
Constitution to protect the actor (sometimes, as in Mar6,uy, an agency of government such as 
the Supreme Court) from being compelled to engage in the particular conduct by the legislat-
ing body in question. In this way even Mar6,uy may be interpreted as a holding of invalidity 
as applied: the Supreme Court cannot be compelled to issue a mandamus in cases not affect-
ing ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a 
party. This analysis avoids reaching the broader, if practically equivalent, question of the 
facial validity of a statute authorizing the Court to issue writs of mandamus to persons hold-
ing office under the authority of the United States. 
148 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) . 
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be told 'if A is found, then B may be found.' " If the suppositions of this 
article on the use of inferences by juries are also true for judges, then the 
rule could be expanded to encompass judges as factfinders. 
The structure of the Allen rule on the constitutionality of inferences 
is: "If B (can) (can not) be rationally deduced as more likely than not 
true from the evidence of A, 149 then the jury (may) (may not) be told 'if 
A is found, then B may be found.' " 
My disagreement with the Allen holding is based in part on a belief 
that every use of an inference instructed in universal terms entails an 
assertion by the trial judge that may or may not be correct on the facts 
of the case. The evidence may lead the judge to think that use of the 
inference is appropriate (or he may have no choice if instructing on the 
inference is required by statute), but what evidence will be credited by 
the jury is unknowable at the time of the instruction so the accuracy of 
the universal assertion in the instruction is not an optional inquiry. The 
judge instructs the jury not to use the inference unless they find the basic 
fact, but if the basic fact is not sufficient to infer the ultimate fact in 
most instances-something the Allen court said was immaterial-then 
the verdict might rest upon an irrational inference. Similarly, if a uni-
versal inference is used to find sufficient evidence to send a case to the 
jury, it should also be facially tested. 
The wisdom of using universal inferences does not follow from fa-
cial validity. The jury is still being encouraged to decide the case on a 
generalization, 150 rather than on particulars. 151 If universal inferences 
are tested facially and not as applied it does not follow that the defend-
ant will be afforded less protection than under Allen. The law of suffi-
ciency of evidence and the constitutional standard of reasonable 
doubt 152 insure sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury. Also, a 
defendant should always be able to claim that a presumption or an in-
149 See note 138 supra. 
150 Characteristically indignant, Jeremy Bentham railed against presumptions, finding the 
" probative force of circumstantial evidence, no fit subject for general rules." Bentham, Ration-
ale of Judicial Evidence, c. xii,§ 11 (1827), in 6 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 50 ff Bowring 
ed. Edinburgh 1843). Bentham argued that resulting "mischiefs" were (1) the use of the rule 
only because the judge thinks the jury will not draw his conclusion, hence each use of a 
presumption entails an incorrectly decided case (observe that it is irrelevant to this argument 
that a presumption may be required by the legislature), (2) a presumption originates non-
rigorously in judicial experience and is subsequently used in cases in which the presumed fact 
is even less well-founded, resulting in "an aggregate mass of pernicious error" and (3) jurors 
"rights" arc violated. Id. at 51-52. Bentham saw mistaken ad hoc inferences by jurors dying 
with the case, but mistaken presumptions created by judges formalizing a "course of error." 
Presumptions to him were made rcbuttablc or conclusive according to whim. Id. at 53. His 
arguments apply to instructed universal inferences. 
I 5 I A proposal for an instruction in particulars appears in text accompanying note 174 
infta. 
152 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
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ference was unconstitutional as applied, meaning that it was instructed 
in a case in which a rational juror could not find that fact A exists. As 
for inferences instructed in particulars by referring not to A but to the 
evidence at trial of A, those should be tested by the Allen doctrine of 
applied validity. Facial validity of such inferences is academic because 
by their terms they encompass no cases except those precisely like the 
case at bar, and properly enunciated; they communicate that fact to the 
jurors. If they are rational in the one case, they are rational in all ex-
actly similar cases. 
The Allen Court's doctrinal error was viewing defendants in that 
case as seeking to assert the rights of others. But statutes have been held 
facially void without reliance on the rights of nonparties. 153 If a rule 
operates the same w~ in every case-as instructed universal inferences 
potentially do--the rule is simply valid or not regardless of the facts of 
the case. Even the Allen Court recognized this in the case of presump-
tions. 
V. THE QUINTESSENCE OF INF.ERENCE INSTRUCTIONS 
Now what is the difference between the report or statement "Five slabs" 
and the order "Five slabs!"?-Well, it is the part which uttering these 
words plays in the language game. No doubt the tone of voice and the 
look with which they are uttered, and much else besides, will also be differ-
ent. But we could also imagine the tone's being the same-for an order 
and a report can be spoken in a variety of tones of voice and with various 
expressions of face-the difference being only in the application. 
Wittgenstein 154 
When the court says that a certain inference may be drawn from cer!ain 
facts, if proven, most juries would understand the instruction as meaning 
that it was their duty to draw such inference. 
Supreme Court of Illinois, 1872 155 
It is true that the instruction only says that the facts stated authorized a 
verdict for the defendant; yet that, coming from the court as an instruc-
tion, would be understood as a declaration of law that, from certain facts, 
a certain conclusion must be drawn. 
Supreme Court of Missouri, 1854 156 
The Supreme Court in Counlj' Court v. Allen saw jury instructions as 
only "generally" controlling on the question of what type of deduction 
device-presumption or inference-was involved in a given case. 157 A 
few weeks later, however, the Court recognized in Sandstrom v. Montana 
that constitutional issues revolving around deduction devices depend 
153 See note 145 supra . 
154 L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 128, at, 21. 
155 Herkelrath v. Stookey, 63 Ill. 486, 488 (1872). 
156 Glover's Admin. v. Duhle, 19 Mo. 360, 361 (1854) . 
157 442 U.S. at 157-58 n.16. 
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completely on the way in which a "reasonable juror could have inter-
preted the instruction." 158 Sandstrom is much closer to the truth than is 
Allen . In Allen the Court said that the interpretation of the instructions 
in a given case "may require recourse to the statute involved and the 
cases decided under it." 159 But if all the jury hears is the instructions 
and does not read the statute and the cases interpreting it , how else can 
presumptions and inferences be analyzed other than by how a typical 
juror understands the instructions? 
This section will therefore examine inference instructions as a juror 
would. While statutes and appellate cases may tell trial judges what the 
substance of the instructions should be, the essential form of inference 
instructions· is limited for analytical purposes to two alternatives: 
universals, which do not refer to the evidence, and particulars, which do 
refer to the evidence as a premise for the deduction offered by the in-
struction. 
A. THE ALLEN CHARGE 
When jurors receive instructions, their self-image takes on a distinc-
tive coloration of receptivity. 160 Besides the magic of the law's author-
ity, the jury will likely feel beholden to and hence anxious to please the 
giver of the instructions, a kindly father or motherfigure, powerful, wise, 
and the only participant in the trial with the jurors' interests at heart. 
Their perception accounts for reversals for instructions that are explic-
itly revelatory of the judge's opinion, even though he cautioned that the 
jurors are the sole judges of the facts. 161 
What a judge says carries persuasive power. 162 He even has the 
power, according to the Supreme Court, to cause jurors to disregard 
facts. 163 In an inference instruction, the judge says "you may deduce," 
but this suggestion comes from The Judge. Even if the inference is 
presented explicitly as an alternative-"you may but need not" 164-it is 
not as if the judge has said nothing at all. He still has unleashed a possi-
bility of deduction backed by his own and the law's prestige. Literally 
neutral statements, such as "you will [accurately) recall that witness W 
158 442 U .S. 510, 514 (1979) . 
159 442 U.S. at 157-58 n.16. 
160 Cf. Head, Confessions ef aJuror, 44 F.R.D. 330, 332 (1967). 
161 Su, e.g. , United States v. Woods, 252 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1958); Sullivan v. United States, 
178 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
162 &e Gordon & Temerlin, Formsz"c Psychology: The Judge and the Jury, 52Juo. 328 (1969); 
Note.Judges ' Nonun-6al &hauz"or z"nJury Tnals: A Threat t0Jud1c1al lmparllalz'ty , 61 VA. L. REv. 
1266 (1975) . 
163 &e Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978) . Cf. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 
466, 470 (1933) Gudge's lightest word or intimation may prove controlling on jury). 
164 &e United States v. Crespo, 422 F.2d 718, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1970). 
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testified to X," call special attention to their subject because uttered by 
the judge. This is not much less than a suggestion to draw the inference 
in "if you find A, then you may conclude B." 165 And a "helpful" and 
easily utilizable suggestion like that stands out starkly against the rest of 
the charge, uselessly obscure or trivially commonsensical snatches of an 
impenetrable lecture. 
The inference instructions in A/Im used the word "presumption," or 
a variant, twelve times. 166 "Presumption" in ordinary language means 
an assumption, something believed without proof. 167 The trial judge 
called the "presumption" an "element of proof," clothed it with the au-
thority of "Our Penal Law," and spoke of a seeming need for rebuttal, 
even if only from a lack of evidence. Yet the judge once used the words 
"you may infer and draw conclusions," and thereby, to the Supreme 
Court, charged an inference and not a presumption. The Court said 
that "the instructions plainly directed the jury to consider all the cir-
cumstances tending to support or contradict the inference that all four 
occupants of the car had possession of the two loaded handguns 
•••• " 168 But even if this is true, instructions did not even hint that the 
jury should not decide the case on the Penal Law generalization based 
165 Cf. R. SUTLIFFE, IMPRESSIONS OF AN AVERAGE JURYMAN 41 (1931) ("some judges 
dwell so pointedly upon the facts in a case that only a juror mentally blind could fail to sec 
the points in His Honor's mind . . . . "). 
166 The instruction was as follows: 
Our Penal Law also provides that the presence in an automobile of any machine gun 
or of any handgun or firearm which is loaded is presumptive evidence of their unlawful 
possession. 
In other words, those presumptions or this latter presumption upon proof of the 
presence of the machine gun and the hand weapons, you may infer and draw a conclu-
sion that such prohibited weapon was possessed by each of the defendants who occupied 
the automobile at the time when such instruments were found. The presumption or 
presumptions is effective only so long as there is no substantial evidence contradicting the 
conclusion flowing from the presumption, and the presumption is said to disappear when 
such contradictory evidence is adduced. 
To establish the unlawful possession of the weapons, again the People relied upon the 
presumption and, in addition thereto, the testimony of Anderson and Lemmons who 
testified in their case in chief. 
Accordingly, you would be warranted in returning a verdict of guilty against the defend-
ants or defendant if you find the defendants or defendant was in possession of a machine 
gun and the other weapons and that the fact of possession was proven to you by the 
People beyond a reasonable doubt, and an clement of such proof is the reasonable pre-
sumption of illegal possession of a machine gun or the presumption of illegal possession 
of firearms, as I have just before explained to you. 
The presumption or presumptions which I discussed with the jury relative to the 
drugs or weapons in this case need not be rebutted by affirmative proof or affirmative 
evidence but may be rebutted by an evidence or lack of evidence in this case. 
442 U.S. at 160-61 nn.19, 20. 
167 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 517. 
168 442 U.S. at 162. 
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on occupancy, if the jurors did not find the evidence decisive one way or 
the other. The judge had charged that the deduction can be made 
"upon proof of the presence of the machine gun and the hand weapons" 
and could apply to "each of the defendants who occupied the automo-
bile at the time when such instruments were found." The particularities 
of the case were entirely ignored in the charge on the inference, which 
was stated to be "the presence in an automobile of any machine gun or 
of any handgun or firearm which is loaded is presumptive evidence of 
their unlawful possession." 
Other portions of the charge, such as on the prosecutor's burden of 
proof, do not neutralize an instructed universal inference because boiler-
plate does not stand in opposition to the proffered generalization. This 
follows not only from the analytical separability of the instructed infer-
ence, but from the commonality of the source of all portions of the in-
struction-the trial judge. An instructed inference stands alone in the 
charge as a sufficient basis unto itself to determine a factual issue, even if 
instructed in terms of the evidence. 
B. INFERENCE INSTRUCTIONS IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE 
No matter how often or in how many ways the judge tells the jurors 
that they are the sole judges of the facts and that he has no opinion on 
the case (a lie so transparent that it is probably counterproductive) ju-
rors might deduce that they would not be given the case if a guilty ver-
dict was not authorized. An instruction on how to deduce guilt 
reinforces this deduction and in turn is galvanized by it. Whether the 
inference instruction is a generalization (universal) or explicitly incorpo-
rates the evidence (particular), it conveys a message that "this is the way 
to find guilt," and has an encouraging effect. 
What follows below is a linguistic analysis of inference instructions 
heightened by a sensitivity to the nature of the judge-jury relationship, 
just as the Supreme Court has analyzed verbal conduct in terms of the 
policeman-civilian relationship. 169 The instruction under analysis is ei-
ther universal or both universal and particular, as many of the points 
made apply to both forms. 
Tautolog 
Proposition P zs true or no/ true. This tautology is always "correct," not 
because of what it says about the world, but because of logic. As a logi-
cal truth, it is valid no matter what the contents of P are. "If you find 
169 Set Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 
(1977); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). 
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A, then you may find B" by extension could be thought to include "or 
find not-B." Then the inference instruction would be offering a tautol-
ogy, B or not-B, and hence offering the jurors nothing but a logical 
truth, something that could not possibly prejudice their deliberations. 
The problem with the surmised extension is that not-B is not of-
fered; the judge does not suggest finding that occupants did not have 
possession from the fact of occupancy. (Moreover, jurors are supposed 
to find whether guilt has been proven, not what defendant did.) Juries 
probably do not assume that judges are telling them that all black cats 
are black. 
A variation is that the instruction does not compel a deduction any 
more than"take it or leave it" compels, because the latter commands 
nothing. "Take it or leave it" may not be an order, 170 but it is certainly 
an offer and perhaps an offer of something the jury would not have con-
sidered without the instruction. 
Redundancy 
Redundancy is on the same level of innocuousness as tautology. 
Redundancy does not offer a logical truth, but adumbrates the methods 
that the jury would use to evaluate the evidence absent the instruction. 
It does not seem likely that juries will consider inference instructions 
redundant, just as it does not seem likely that legislatures and judges 
would use inference instructions if they were redundant and hence of no 
effect. While the jury already may have thought that A implies B in a 
given case, the instruction seems more substantial than a reference to the 
power of the particular evidence in the case. The jurors may assume 
that the judge says nothing that is apparent to them, or at least that his 
words might have special meanings in a trial ("technically the law is 
.... "). Jurors might think that the judge would not be telling them 
something obvious about reasoning from the evidence-why would he 
bother? 
Allmtion Getter 
An inference instruction arguably is simply an attention getter, like 
"Be careful!," which r:eminds the jury of what it knows about the evi-
dence, without suggestively sponsoring a theory of the case. "Be care-
ful!" tells the listener to take care, not of what or how. "Be careful!" 
does not help with that which is not obvious upon slightly extending 
one's vista, so the analysis would be that the inference instruction adds 
nothing of content to the trial. 
The problem with this model is that, in the case of an inference, one 
170 See L. WrrrGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BooKS 161 (2d ed. 1960). 
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can "be careful" without knowing how to take care: one can find B just 
by saying "I find B." Of course, the instructor may have intended that 
jurors go through a process of ratiocination before concluding that B is 
the fact, but the instruction is not explicit on this if it contains the bare 
operative term "infer." The Allen instruction said "you may infer and 
draw a conclusion." This may mean nothing to jurors other than "an-
nounce a finding of B." Inference instructions can be interpreted as an 
endorsement of a finding arrived at just by stating a finding is made. In 
other words, the instruction may appear to a juror as a multiple-choice 
question; checking a box ("I find B") may appear to jurors to be a legiti-
mate way of reaching a conclusion absent confidence in other means of 
doing so. If the jury takes the instruction's "advice," no juror ratiocina-
tion necessarily occurs. 
Qµestion 
Is the judge asking jurors "does B follow from A in this case?" If 
that is all he is doing, avoidance of examination of facial validity is justi-
fiable, as questions can be analyzed as having no truth value; "is it rain-
ing?" is neither true nor false. 
A judge will be thought to ask questions that can reasonably be 
answered affirmatively. The question-model reduces to an issue of re-
dundancy; no reason appears to jurors for a judge to ask them if certain 
things happened or can be done or deduced unless one acceptable an-
swer is yes. Naturally the same holds true when they are asked "is he 
guilty?," but that question is unavoidable unless the judge tells jurors 
that the law requires cases to be sent to them even if the evidence is 
insufficient to support a verdict of guilty-a white lie, but a very reason-
able one. The inference "question" asks whether this is a way of decid-
ing the case, which opens up the issue of why the judge is pointing out 
ways of deciding the case to begin with. The factfinder should be left to 
its own devices; cases should be decided without judicial hints. An in-
structed inference, even seen as a question, is undeniably a hint. 
Permission, Choice, or Invitation 
An inference instruction can give permission to a jury to do some-
thing it would otherwise not have thought itself able to do. More en-
couraging than formal permission is an informally offered choice. 
Stronger still is a cordial invitation to find B from A. 
The permissive nature of the instruction can be seen by considering 
that the judge says "you may infer." Obviously he is not predicting, as 
in "you may find this book enjoyable." The Allen Court saw the jury 
reasoning from the evidence before deciding whether to take advantage 
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of the permission. Yet one does not say "I may infer;" one says "I can 
infer" or " I infer." Someone in authority saying "you may infer" might 
be pointing to the conclusion, the "can," the announcement of the in-
ferred fact, not the process of going through the inferring. The response 
could be "Yes, I infer," accepting the permission and ratifying the route 
to B as proposed by the judge: from A given only that A first be found 
to exist in the case. "You may reach the conclusion that B exists" does 
not inevitably require a process of reasoning to find B . 
Proposition or Axiom 
The jury might take the instruction to be a statement of fact which 
has been confirmed by the law or the judge or, worse yet, as an undebat-
ably true supposition. "If you find A , then you can infer B" strikes those 
legally trained as a legalism, because they see it in context as a legal 
rule. To a layman, though, it might sound like a law of nature, factual, 
about the world, knowledge added to the mix. The judge says that if 
certain things happen, certain other things are associated therewith. 
This does not sound as inuch like the opening up of an issue to a layman 
as much as a readymade finding which can be plugged in upon finding 
A. This model is supported strongly by the history of instructed infer-
ences, which shows that lawmakers wanted to present juries with prefab-
ricated conclusions.171 
Norm 
Juries might take instructions not as statements of fact, which they 
could test by the evidence, but as normative statements which they 
ought to follow. The jury listens to many statements about what it must 
do: follow the law as the judge lays it down, give the defendant a pre-
sumption of innocence, consider only the evidence, and so on. In the 
midst of all this an inference instruction could blend in as another nor-
mative proposition. Not that the jury would necessarily think that they 
must draw the inference, but that they should strive to. 
An example of what in cold print looks like permission, but which 
operates orally as a normative statement, appears in the "satisfactory 
explanation" part of the instruction in Romano, Leary, Turner, Dames, and 
Cazn9. In this instruction, the judge says that "if A is found, then you 
may infer B, unless A has been satisfactorily explained." In Alim the 
judge said the inference "is effective only so long as there is no substan-
tial evidence contradicting the conclusion flowing from" it.172 
Logically, the "satisfactory explanation" component seems to be a 
1 71 &e text accompanying note 42 supra . 
172 &e note 166 supra . 
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reason for not exercising the option afforded by the instructed inference, 
an "out" for the party against whom the inference might be drawn. But 
an actual satisfactory explanation can be conspicuous by its absence 
once a judge has mentioned it in his charge. If a reason not to exercise 
an option is stated, it might be interpreted as the sole reason. Consider 
the statement "You may leave the room." Assuming that the context is 
not imperious, that is, the speaker is not a teacher addressing a pupil, 
the statement seems to be one of permission. Add a ground for not tak-
ing advantage of the permission: "You may leave the room, unless you 
have a good reason not to." Literally this is as permissive as the 
unadorned statement, yet it sounds compulsory, like "Absent a good 
reason not to leave the room, you must leave." 
Gibbnish 
Perhaps inference instructions are not unambiguous or clear 
enough to be intelligible. Some people have concluded that most in-
structions are unintelligible to jurors. 173 The question of the effective. 
meaning of the Allen instruction divided the Supreme Court 
five-to-four. But jurors who do not understand inference instructions to 
convey anything denotatively may still be washed over by a connota-
tion-that the case can be decided a certain way just because the judge 
says so. And the hypothesis that an instruction is taken as gibberish does 
not seem an entirely satisfactory basis upon which to avoid testing its 
abstract validity. 
C. A PROPOSAL 
Suppose a judge were given the task of instructing a jury on · the 
sufficiency of A to prove B without tilting the jury toward the prosecu-
tion, and certainly without affording them the chance to decide the case 
on a generalization. I propose the following for the solution of this prob-
lem: 
Some people would look to the circumstances of defendants being in the 
car (if the State's evidence about that is credited by you) and the circum-
stances of the guns being in the car-where they were, their visibility, their 
size, where defendants were each sitting, and anything else about the de-
fendants and the guns being there that helps you decide--and use all of 
173 &, j. FRANK, CoURTS ON TRIAL 116-18 (1949); A REPORT ON A SURVEY OF TENTH 
CIRCUIT JURORS 15, 21,pa.r.rim (1954); Strawn & BuchananJury Con.fusion: A T/,r,aJ toJu.rlu,, 
59 Juo. 478 (1976). Cf. Charrow & Charrow, Maiin1 Lllfll lanl""I, Undn.rlanda/Ju: A P.rydw-
/ingui.rlic Study of Jury In.rtrwlion.r , 79 CoLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979) (an attempt to isolate the 
linguistic features typical of "legalese" that cause juron to have comprehension problems, to 
rewrite jury instructions in light of those features, and an empirical verification of the efficacy 
of those revised instructions) . &, also Judges Rn1ist111 Guid, lo In.rlnKI CiuilJri.r, N. Y.L.J., Sept. 
26, 1979, at 1, col. 2. 
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those circumstances as a basis for figuring out that the defendants knew 
the guns were there, had access to them, could control them-in other 
words, had possession as I've defined "possession." Other people would 
look at those same circumstances and not be too sure. [Pause.) The reason 
you are here and not those various other people I've mentioned is that 
everybody connected with this trial and with our system wants you to de-
cide this case for yourselves. What do you think? 174 
Since the proposed instruction incorporates the evidence no func-
tional difference exists between its facial validity and its validity as ap-
plied. Unless the Constitution forbids judicial comment on the 
evidence-a question on which the author expresses no opinion-it can 
hardly be unconstitutional for the judge to suggest a line of deduction 
which, under the facts of the case, would be rational. Whether it is good 
policy is still another question. The constitutional test for the proposed 
instruction is, therefore, as in Allen: whether a rational factfinder could 
make the deduction authorized. Whether the deduction would be cor-
rect to a reviewing court more times than not or correct beyond a rea-
sonable doubt does not matter; if the jury would be permitted to make 
such a deduction-if the evidence of the basic fact is sufficient to take 
the issue of the inferred fact to the jury175-then there is nothing irra-
tional about the judge pointing this out. Whether judges should be per-
mitted to comment in criminal trials is another issue entirely, but one 
which goes to the role of the jury, not the rationality of the trial. 
The Allen Court required only that the jury be able to make the 
instructed deduction with a standard of certitude more likely true than 
false .176 But the Court thereby committed the classic mistake of classify-
ing a deduction device as a chunk of evidence rather than as a proc-
ess. 177 While an item of evidence is the proverbial brick that builds the 
wall, an inference or a presumption is the laborer who does the building. 
The Court evidently saw the record as a melange of testimony, tangible 
1 74 One commentator proposes that the judge tell the jury that fact A is highly probative 
on the existence of B and could, when considered together with other circumstantial evidence 
which the jurors might credit, warrant a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
claims that such an instruction would accomplish the legislature's objectives. Nesson, supra 
note 2, at 1223. But one of the legislature's objectives is to inform the jury that A is sufficient 
to find B, at least insofar as legislative intent can be deduced from the plain meaning of the 
enacted inferences. Professor Nesson asserts, however, that the legislature's objectives were to 
criminalize B and communicate that A is "highly probative" of B . Id. at 1222. "Highly 
probative" is hardly as forceful as "legally sufficient" to find a fact . As to telling the jury to 
consider fact A with other circumstantial evidence, it is unclear whether Professor Nesson 
means all other circumstantial evidence in the case, or simply the particulars of fact A as 
manifested in the evidence. 
175 &e Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
176 442 U.S. at 166-67. 
177 &e McBane, Presumptions; Are They Euidmce?, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 518 (1938). On cate-
gory mistakes generally see G. RYLE, supra note 131, at 16-18. 
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items of proof, and inferences, to be weighed as a whole when reviewing 
sufficiency of the evidence. 178 Yet it is inference from evidence that is 
the subject of the reasonable doubt standard when sufficient evidence to 
find a fact beyond a reasonable doubt is certified. 179 So the instructed 
deduction must be one which a rational factfinder c~:mld make beyond a 
reasonable doubt; 180 as I stated above, this does not mean that the de-
duction must be believed by a reviewing court to be true beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The notorious complexity of the subject of deduction devices is no 
excuse for the Allen Court's insensitivity to the effect instructions have 
upon jurors. Interpretation of a judge's instructions in a lawyerlike 
manner-a methodology apparently abandoned by the Court two 
weeks later in Sandstrom-avoids the crucial dimension of impact on the 
layman. Ironically enough, the famous earlier decision in Allen v. United 
Stales, 181 which upheld the "dynamite charge," also proceeded from a 
one-dimensional analysis of instructions. In the earlier Allen case, a 
charge that juror hold-outs should question their position and take into 
account that a majority disagrec;d with them was approved, the Court 
stating that "[i)t certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not 
listen with deference to the arguments and with a distrust of his own 
judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view 
of the case .. . . " 182 That "certainly cannot be the law," but the issue 
the giving of an instruction raises is not simply what is the law, but also 
how will the jurors interpret the instruction. Counlj' Court v. Allen was a 
triumph of pedantry over realism. 
170 Bui if. J. THAYER, supra note 42, at 337 (inferences are separate from evidence and 
should not be weighed as one "mass of probative matter'') . 
179 Su 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 39, § 467, at 259-60. 
180 &e Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 318. 
181 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) . &e 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 39, § 502, at 
353-60. 
102 164 U.S. at 501. 
